

Gerhard Chlubek
1st Lieutenant, 355rd SIS Regt. East,
Luftwaffe

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6th July, 1945

Curriculum VitaeI. Personal Data

- 2.3.1912 Born in Leipzig. Father: August Chlubek, technical employee of the provincial administration of Silesia. Mother: Iunia, nee Karwoth. 4 sisters.
- 13.4.1943 Married to Gretel Boehme, daughter of the merchant Hugo Boehme in Deutschneudorf, Saxonian Erzgebirge. Marriage at present without children.

II. Schooling and Professional Education

4. 1918 - 3. 1923 Studied at the Catholic elementary school in Hybrid G/S.
4. 1923 - 3. 1933 Studied at the Humanistic Gymnasium in Brieg.
11. 1933 - 10. 1935 Studied law and economy at the Friedrich Wilhelm University in Breslau
11. 1935 - 12. 1937. Rapid clerk at Carl Schirlewan AG., Breslau

III. Professional Career

1. 1938 - Present Reich employee in the Luftwaffe

IV. Military Career

10. 1935 - 9. 1936 Military service with the 3. Co.-Signal Corps Hq. M in Breslau. Training as radio man. Discharged as Pfc. of the Res.
- 25.5.1940 Called up again into the Wehrmacht
6. 1940 - 6. 1941 Sent to the Leather Radio Receiving Station 23 (M-23) as intercept - R/P man and analyst in the western theatre and in Poland.
- 1.10.1940 Promoted to Sergeant
- 1.3.1941 Promoted to Staff Sergeant
7. 1941 - 2. 1942 Arrive as analyst at the W-Leit. 4 and at the 1st Co. Air Signal Regt. 4 during the Russian campaign.

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1.10.1941	Accepted as OCS candidate
1.2.1942	Commissioned 2nd Lieutenant
3.1942 - 10.1944	Active as analyst and HVO (liaison officer) at 9. Co. Air Signal Rgt. 4, and 14. Co. Air Signal Rgt. 353 during the Russian campaign
11.1944 - Cessation of hostilities	Active as analyst at 13. Co. Air Signal Rgt. 353, and Ia at III. Bn. Air Signal Rgt. 353 in the home zone of the interior.
1.11.1944	Promoted to 1st Lieutenant.

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Gerhard Chlubek TOP SECRET
1st Lt., 353rd SIS Regt., East,
Luftwaffe

Biography

I was born on 2 March 1912 in Leipzig, the son of a humble civil service employee. 4 sisters were born after me, so, as only son in the family I was always somewhat spoiled, by my mother and sisters as well. This had no good effect on my later life and the development of my character. After four years of Grammar school I entered the respectable old classical Academy in Brieg, Silesia, in 1923, where I remained until my "Abitur" in 1933. Those were good times, for we still had the marvelous old classicist types for teachers, and they made school life unforgettable. Literature, foreign languages and sport were my favorite activities, while mathematics and allied sciences I looked upon with hostility.

In the last three years of my school life (1930 - 1933) the ever more violent internal political struggles that were then raging in Germany took hold of us young men as well. With the fanaticism of youth we contested more vigorously and bitterly than did our elders, for we were fighting for our future. We all saw that a new World Order had to come and would come. On this account were all the financial anxieties of our parents at home, and the best proof of all was the army of unemployed, millions strong, that roamed the highways. We imagined ourselves joining these grey ranks as soon as we graduated from school, and we wanted a better world order. But the word "how" was the bone of contention.

Nazi, German National, and anti-fascist groups were formed in school - naturally against the rules, for at this time there was a thoroughly sensible prohibition for all political activity in schools - and we battled most desperately. In spite of these political differences we remained good friends. I remember well now we three most conspicuous representatives of different political opinions walked up and down the school corridors arm in arm on the day of graduation for demonstration purposes, to the applause of teachers and pupils alike, who were impressed by this show of good fellowship.

At that time I was known as the representative of the anti-fascists, and this I was in fact, because I did not like Nazi radicalism whose representatives made a great many idiotic speeches about cultural matters at that time. As I expressed myself quite freely on these subjects, a few days after my graduation in May 1933, the Gestapo arrested me and locked me up. Nothing criminal could be proved against me except that I had said what I thought, so after a short period of incarceration I was released from prison. Naturally that was not a good start for my professional career, for since I had been mixed up with the Gestapo I was considered politically unreliable, and could obtain no scholarships or state assistance. I was also stubborn enough not to neutralize this political unreliability by entering some Nazi organization, a very popular move in those days. When my mother became very sick on account of this circumstance, and we thus came into financial straits at home, I had to cut short the study of law and economics I had begun in 1933 in the University of Breslau, in order to earn my living.

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After a short period of business activity I was called into service in the fall of 1935 and served one year in the Radio Signal Company of the 48th Corps Signal Battalion in Breslau. Here I discovered in myself a good talent for radio operation, which was to have a bearing on my later life. When in 1937 the Luftwaffe sent out a call for civilian radio operators, who were to enjoy good financial considerations, I made application and was hired. In this fashion I came to the SIS. In the first years I was active as intercept operator for Russian, Polish and Czechoslovakian traffic. Even though we intercept operators were not allowed to see what went on in the analysis section at that time, it was already very interesting to figure out the stations that belonged together in a net out of the great formless profusion of the world's W/T traffic, and despite changes in frequency and call signs to pick them out again every time and recognize who was who. I considered it as a sport, and it gave me much pleasure. After listening for a long time one became very familiar with one's brother radio operators across the border, by their characteristic fists, and one was glad to pick them up out of the ether, likened to times when one meets old and intimate friends.)

The Russians had the worst W/T operators, and oftentimes one wished to give them a refresher course so that it would be more fun to listen to them. In the winter campaign against Finland in 1939-1940 the Russian traffic began for the first time to show evidence of better operators, apparently they were professional operators who had already operated on the international nets, and had joined the Army. The typical Russian military abbreviations suddenly became interlarded with international Q-signals and the sending speed was noticeably increased. We soon figured out that these "super operators" had only been taken into the command nets, and in this manner we had the first hand hold in figuring out who comprised the nets. On the whole the information extracted by German Signal Intelligence in the Russo-Finnish war showed the German High Command so clearly the true value of the SIS that it was decisive in bringing about the development and encouragement of the service by higher headquarters.

The coverage of the Czech and Polish Air Force Traffic had little military value. Outside regular weather and take-off and landing reports of the safety service on the airfields there was only some occasional alternate W/T and R/T traffic from artillery observation planes. Plane-to-plane traffic and fighter control traffic were never picked up as such, and as was later established, didn't exist. The only information was the position and number of operational airfields and the number of flights from them. From the limited and primitive signals traffic one could draw conclusions as to the state of training and military value of these two air forces.

The outbreak of war found me in an out-station in Silesia. I remember clearly that we were all in a pretty serious state of mind, for all had an idea of what sort of suffering this war could bring. In spite of this we considered it inevitable, because we were convinced that our government had done everything possible to get back by peaceful means the territory taken from Germany at the treaty of Versailles. The war seemed to us a natural catastrophe, an act of God, in the face of which man is impotent.

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At that time I don't believe any German had any real hatred in his heart for any one of the nations which were our enemies. We believed we were fighting for our rights, and that was the end of it.

I was not called to the colors immediately upon the outbreak of war, but continued to discharge my duties as intercept and D/F operator against Poland and Russia in a civilian capacity. Shortly before the Russian campaign I first put on a uniform and began my military career as Pfc in the Air Signal Corps, in III Battalion Ln. Rgt. 4 (later III Bn. Ln. Rgt. 355). Within the confines of this battalion I remained until the capitulation, serving in the southern sector of the Eastern Front against Russia, and, except for two interruptions, I worked in the final evaluation section of this battalion.

It was my duty as evaluation man to gather the intelligence obtained by the individual Referate, to work them into flashes or reports and pass them on to the operational commands. In the last year of the war I took on the additional duties of Ia (A-3), that is, I was adviser to the Commander in all questions of assignment and organization.

The first interruption of this analysis work was temporary duty with an intercept company of the army a few weeks after my promotion to officer in the first months of 1942. The purpose of this TD was to pass on the items of signal intelligence picked up by the army as fast as possible to the Fliegerkorps of Field Marshal v. Richthofen. It was principally a question of close-range targets (air support). This mission did not have a huge success, because the army had only very few reports of interest to the Luftwaffe. I brought back to my outfit some valuable improvements in traffic analysis. In this respect the Army intercept outfits were a little ahead of us at that time, as they had an extensive analysis of the contents of messages. In addition, this assignment gave me the opportunity to learn about the wire-tapping service of the Army, thanks to a visit to a short range intelligence troop in the HML (Front line) area of Sebastopol.

The second interruption in my career as analyst lasted somewhat longer. (November 1942 - February 1944). It was TD with the staff of Luftflotte 4 as SIS Liaison Officer. In this capacity I served under A-2 (Ic) and had the duty of putting before the command staff all items of signal intelligence and seeing to the distribution of this information to the higher and lower Luftwaffe headquarters and Army headquarters concerned. At first I had considerable difficulties, because at that time the significance of Signal Intelligence was not nearly as widely known as it should have been. We were known as "Funkbolschewisten" and "Atrocity propagandists" (Grauelpropagandisten), and the A-2 (Ic) and to a still greater extent the A-3 (Ia) officers depended for their picture of the situation almost exclusively on photographic and visual reconnaissance. I was forced to the dismal conclusion that information obtained through Signal Intelligence was by no means looked upon as a very fine thing, but that it was necessary to go to great lengths (sketches, sales talks, hints, proofs, suggestions) to get the operational headquarters interested in this important and reliable source of intelligence, and to convince them of its value. Just as business men put on an advertising campaign for new merchandise, so did we

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SI-liaison officers have to plug for our branch of the service, until it became more and more an indispensable instrument of command. (In my opinion the cause of these primary obstacles which the SIS had to surmount, was the senseless mumbo-jumbo of secrecy with which it was saturated. Only a very limited circle within the very highest commands even knew of its existence, whereas the troops derived no benefits from it whatever. This was how secret the SIS was. It is obvious that the origin of a piece of signal intelligence must be kept as secret as possible, but the resulting information should be disseminated among the troops, and find its way to the greatest possible number of people who can make use of it, without giving away the source. Only in this way will signal intelligence really have its possibilities exhausted. This sounds self-evident, but in those days it was by no means so, and a long time lapsed before the responsible German headquarters officers came around to that point of view.)

An SI-liaison officer had a particularly good position from which to contemplate the constant increase in appreciation of signal intelligence, because the reports, which first had to be pressed on the people, after a while were almost torn right out of our hands. Later the SIS enjoyed so much confidence that the impossible was demanded of it. Naturally it must not be lost sight of that this development was helped along very considerably by the ever more noticeable enemy air superiority, which made reconnaissance flights almost impossible towards the end. Therefore the high command was forced to lean more and more heavily on other sources of information.

An SI-liaison officer obtained a valuable filling-in and extension of the picture of the enemy situation otherwise obtained through signal intelligence by reason of the fact that he was present at all prisoner of war interrogations and took part in the evaluation of captured enemy equipment and documents. After concluding this TD and returning to my own outfit I was able to put to good use, in my analysis work, the things I had learned from these sources. A further advantage of this TD was that one got a complete picture of the particulars of the high headquarters and the troops, which enabled one to put one's evaluation into a correspondingly relevant form.

I had charge of the final analysis evaluation of the battalion up until the day of capitulation, that day on which together with the German Armed forces every german soldier saw all hope of a better future crumble before his eyes. Without news of wife, parents, or brothers and sisters, anxiety for one's personal future stands together with an equal anxiety for the future of home, Fatherland, and Europe itself.

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Gunter L i e r
1st Lieutenant, 352nd SIS Regt., South,
Luftwaffe

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6 July, 1945

Curriculum Vitae

27.4.1919	Born in Brunswick Father: Frits Ider, Postal Inspector Mother: Gertrud, nee Neubert
1925 - 1929	Elementary school in Brunswick
1929 - 1937	Wilhelm-Gymnasium in Brunswick, completed by "Abitur" (final state examination)
1931 - 1933	Member of the Baendische Youth Organization
1933 - 1936	Member of H.J. (Hitler Youth)
1.10.1937 - 25.3.1938	Reich Labor Service
1.4.1938	Entry as 2 year volunteer in the Air Signal section, Air Signal Replacement Co. 5/17, Brun- swick-Waggum
April - Aug. 1938	Basic training
Aug. 1938 - 25.8.1939	Training as radio interceptor in the 2./Air Signal Rgt. 2 and 3./Air Signal Rgt. 2, Brun- swick-Querum
Autumn 1938	During the crisis of Sudetenland active as radio interceptor in the W-Stelle Trier (coverage area: Equatorial France)
1.4.1939	Promoted to Pfc.
March - July 1939	Active as radio interceptor at W-22, Husum (coverage: England)
25.8.1939	Transfer into 9./Air Signal Rgt. 2, Brunswick- Querum
Dec. 1939 - Jan. 1940	Radio interceptor at W-22, Husum
20.1.1940 - 25.3.1940	WKO school in Munster-Cremendorf
April - June 1940	Radio interceptor at WO-222, Pevsum
1 July 1940	Promoted to Sergeant

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July - November 1940	Radio interceptor at 9./Air Signal Rgt. 2 in Haerland (Norway)
Nov. - Dec. 1940	Instructor for new radio interceptors
Jan. 1941 - 10.3.1941	Radio interceptor at 9./Air Signal Rgt. 40 in Sicily (Taormina). Coverage English ground-air traffic in the Mediterranean and Near East.
15.2.1941	Accepted as war time officer candidate
10.3.1941 - 25.5.1941	Officer school Air Signal school in Halle
1.4.1941	Promoted to Staff Sergeant
June 1941 - Dec. 1941	Active as Technical Sgt. and Duty Officer at 9./Air Signal Rgt. 40
1 Nov. 1941	Promoted to Lieutenant
Dec. 1941 - Aug. 1944	Active as chief traffic analyst, in charge of the Co. analysis, in the campaign to cover Allied air traffic in the Mediterranean. Near East, at 9./Air Signal Rgt. 40, later 8./Air Signal Rgt. South East in Kifissia/Athens.
1.3.1944	Promoted to 1st Lieutenant
Aug. 1944 - Dec. 1944	In charge of the Bn. later Rgt. analysis Co. (14./South East/25. Air Signal Rgt. 325 in Pant-schowa and Premstatten).
Dec. 1944 - cessation of hostilities	In charge of the Flight Path Tracing Platoon, H/F-R/T and W/T at Meldekopf 4. Coverage of Allied strategic Bomber formations stationed South East and of partisan supplies in the South Eastern area.

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Gunter L i e r
1st Lt., 352nd SIS Regt., South
Luftwaffe

Biography

Date of birth: 27 April 1919

Place of birth: Brunswick

Education: 1925 - 1929 elementary school, 1929 - 1937 Wilhelm Gymnasium, Brunswick (Latin and Greek all the way through); Real-Gymnasiale Abteilung (Dept.) concluded by "Abitur" (state examination) (Latin and Greek only a few years, more Mathematics and Physics).

In the spring of 1931 joined the Boy Scout youth movement, autumn 1933 entered the Hitler youth movement. Active there 1933 - 1936. Reich Labor Service: 1 October 1937 - 25 March 1938. Wehrmacht: Entrance into Wehrmacht on 1 April 1938 as 2-year volunteer in the Air Force Signal troops, Signal Replacement Company (reserve 10) 5/17 Brunswick-Waggum. After 4 months basic training (mainly infantry training; at the same time radio intercept training) transferred into the radio intercept platoon of the 2nd Signal Rgt., Brunswick-Querum. Conditions for being accepted into the radio intercept platoon: intercept speed 18 w.p.m. In the platoon, most intensive intercept training; training in English and German radio traffic; practical work on the receiver for English radio traffic. The intercept performances were increased, until they reached the goal of clear text reception of 22 w.p.m.

Crisis of Sudetenland autumn 1938. Transfer into the Meteorological Radio Observation Station at Trier.

In Kusel (Saarpfalz). Coverage of radio networks inside equatorial France. Lesson from the experience of this mission: each interceptor took up his task with great enthusiasm; but on one hand the higher headquarters failed to give properly thought out directives with regard to the coverage; on the other, they gave out no current information on the results achieved by radio interception. Consequences: after the military political situation had calmed down, the enthusiasm for the job diminished in some instances.

Return to Brunswick-Querum. Continued training in radio intercept work in the SI-platoon.

From March to July 1939, I was ordered to take over as radio interceptor at Weather Radio Receiving Station Husum (W-22) covering radio traffic of England. The W-station was manned by civilian radio operators and we young soldiers handled unimportant traffic. Mistake: the use of these radio men as co-interceptors for important English radio nets with a large volume of traffic would have provided practical experience and would have brought about the greatest interest for the task.

On 1 April 1939 advancement to Gefreiter (Pfc.).

July 1939, TD back at the radio intercept platoon of the 3rd Bn.; 2nd Sig. Regt. in Brunswick-Querum. During the summer maneuvers of Luftflotte 2 the radio intercept platoon took part in order to monitor the radio traffic

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within Luftflotte 2. The training included improvement of code speed, instruction on English radio traffic, instructions on radio equipment and from time to time practical radio interception of English point-to-point nets.

At the beginning of the war the 9th Company of the 2nd Signal Regiment under the command of Capt. Windels was activated in Brunswick-Querum. The personnel of this Co. was composed of the Radio Intercept platoon of the 3rd Bn. of the 2nd Signal Regt., and reserves called up to active duty in this Co. The intensive intercept training was continued. I came for some brief practical instruction to W-Leitstelle 2, which was established at that time in Brunswick-Querum.

Middle of November 1939 the company was moved to Husum-Schwabstedt. From December until January 1940 I was stationed at the W-station 22, Husum, as radio operator. Coverage: ground-air traffic, England proper.

January until June 1940 stationed as intercept operator at the outstation of the W-22 of the W-222 in Pevsum. Coverage: English sea reconnaissance (Southern England) and the radio traffic of the Channel Islands.

1 June 1940 promoted to Unteroffizier.

June 1940, transfer of the Co. to Southern Norway (Naerland). Again I was used as a radio interceptor. Through the frequent changes of the English radio traffic, I got a comprehensive picture of the whole English radio traffic ground-to-ground as well as ground-to-air. (During the summer of the same year I gained insight into the English naval radio traffic thanks to a special mission, that included the observation of a special English naval frequency (convoy traffic off the east coast of England and air- and naval protection). The traffic on this frequency was very important, for by a study of it we were able to determine the enemy naval situation off the English east coast; it made possible recognition of the convoys and other ship movements, and enabled subsequent attack. On account of the success of this intercept work I received from the Commanding General of the X-Fliegerkorps the Iron Cross II Class.

Before the Company was moved from Norway to Sicily I was assigned for two months as training sergeant for new intercept personnel. During this activity I had a good chance to use the knowledge gained by my theoretical and practical work on interception.

December 1940 - January 1941 movement of the Company from southern Norway to Sicily (Taormina). By this change of position an entirely new task developed for us: RAF in the whole Mediterranean and near east. Again I was assigned as radio operator and I covered mainly the naval reconnaissance frequency in the Mediterranean. Besides I was made watch leader as replacement of another and gained a little insight to the tactical channels through which signal intelligence passed.

On the 15 February 1941 I was accepted as OCS candidate, and on the 10 March 1941 I was sent to the OCS of the Air Signal School. This course

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of instruction lasted until 25 May 1941. From the standpoint of intercept work I saw in the signal school that none of the instructing officers had the least knowledge of the set up and working methods of the German intercept units. They mentioned the existence of the intercept organizations, but otherwise it was stated over and over again, that for security reasons no further explanations would be given. After completing officer's school I returned to the Company in Sicily. From then on the intensive training and instructions in all important fields of the intercept service started with the goal in mind to know, as a future intercept officer, all the questions and answers in this special field. First I became watch leader and gained thereby knowledge of the daily operational reports of the intercept service. After that I was made duty officer, solely responsible for passing on, in tactical language, the radio intelligence reports to the tactical organizations (Fliegerkorps) for immediate use.

June 1941 the Company moved from Sicily to Athens-Kifissia. Coverage did not change. In this campaign there was again the closest collaboration with the Fliegerkorps. Once more I was made duty officer and in addition Traffic and D/F evaluation officer. Administratively I was placed in command of the intercept platoon. The main task, I had to fulfill as D.O. and as chief traffic analyst, was to recognize quickly offensive or reconnaissance missions of the Allied Air Forces by hearing the beginning of ground-to-air and ground-to-ground traffic, and thereby giving the German Air Defense enough time for preparations and interception of the approaching formations. By steady participation in the briefings of superior tactical units (Fliegerkorps) I constantly picked up new hints and encouragements, which opened up for me new possibilities and working methods.

On the 1 November 1941 I was promoted to Lieutenant, after 7 months service as Feldwebel (Staff Sergeant). April 1942 transfer of the Company from Kifissia to Crete (Kunawi). The coverage did not change, but became larger and larger due to the constant reinforcements of the Allied Air Force. The Company received new assignments when the first American bomber formations (9th Bomber Command) appeared. My post as duty officer (Offizier von Dienst) concluded in spring 1942 when I took over a part of the "Endauswertung" (final analysis). In this position (Endauswerter), I continued to be the chief traffic and D/F plotting analyst and got the final picture of the deployment and strategy of the Allied Air Force in the Mediterranean and near east. In summer 1942 my training as intercept officer was completed and I took charge of the "Endauswertung" (final analysis). From this time on I retained the same position in the same Company and later took over the Regimental analysis.

The coverage of this Company remained the same except for small changes which became necessary by the ever growing deployment of the Allied Air Forces in the Mediterranean and near east. During my activity as chief analyst of the Company, I considered again and again one of the most important tasks, besides making up an operational report of the situation, the spotting of imminent offensive and reconnaissance missions from the ground-to-air and ground-to-ground radio traffic. In handling this task I always

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profited from my practical experience as a radio operator, chiefly by the conception that the radio operator is the first analyst. I continued in charge of the radio intercept platoon as the analysis officer and close collaboration between the intercept and analyst personnel was assured.

In late summer 1943 the Company moved from Crete to Athens-Loutsa.

On the 1 March 1944 I was promoted to 1st Lieutenant.

The coverage of the Co., which in the meantime had changed its title to 8th SIS Regt. Southeast and later to SIS Regt. 352 South became much smaller during the time that followed, because as the American Bomber formations moved further West, another Company took over coverage of these formations and the RAF formations which followed. Until my transfer to the regimental analysis company, I was concerned only with the deployment and tactics of the Air Headquarters Eastern Mediterranean.

In autumn 1944 I was transferred to the 25th Company of the 352nd SIS Regt. and took charge of the analysis. The company was stationed in Pant-schowa near Belgrad and after moving back of the South East front, went on to Premstätten near Graz, Austria.

In December of the same year I took charge of the "Flugwegverfolgungszug" (aircraft course tracing platoon) (short wave W/T and R/T) which was used to cover the American heavy bomber formations (15th USAF) with 25 radio receivers. This independent platoon was stationed in Graz-Grottenhof and was used exclusively to record the flight paths. During my activity as leader of this platoon it was again the most important job to recognize imminent offensive missions from the American W/T and R/T traffic, in order to furnish timely warnings and this problem was also solved in a satisfactory manner. The D/F net traffic was directed by the aircraft course tracing platoon and results were transmitted to the Meldekopf in Vienna.

In February 1945 the aircraft course tracing platoon moved from Graz to Vienna.

In April 1945 this platoon moved, together with the Meldekopf and the Regt., to Attersee. I was in charge of this platoon which, just before the end of the war, became a Company.

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Werner Rasch
Lieutenant, 353rd SIS Regt. East,
German Luftwaffe

Extract from my Curriculum Vitae

Personal Data:

Born on 22 March, 1913 in Gladenbach, Kreis Biedenkopf, Hessen-Nassau.
Father: Otto Rasch, Studienrat (educational adviser to the State, title) at
a High School for girls.

Education and Professional Training:

3 years Elementary School, 9 years Humanistic Gymnasium, Matura (final
state exam.) March 1931 at Gymnasium in Herne/Westph., 2 semesters Mathematics,
Physics and Athletics.

Political Activity:

1934 entered the NSFK (National Socialist Flieger Corps), active there
at glider construction and glider training.

Military Service:

Nov. 1936 - May 1937 radio training at the aviation training center
Gelsenkirchen. June - July 1937 first military trg. in Detmold - military
basic trg. and promotion to Pfc. Sept. 1937 entered the Signal Intelligence
Service of the Air Force as a civilian employee. June - July 1939, 8 weeks
trg. at the Sig. Bn. in Gremendorf and promotion to Sgt. Accepted as Reser-
ve Officer Candidate. From May 1939 an analyst at W-Leit 2. May 1940 ordered
to Varna/Bulgaria. Nov. 1940 called into military service at 9./Air Sig.
Rgt. 4. Active with this Co. in SIS in the Balkans and later in the Russian
campaign. Nov. 1942 promotion to Lt. Feb. 1943 Chief Analyst of a team of
III/Air Sig. Rgt. 4. From July 1944 on Chief Analyst of long-range bombing
at III/353.

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Werner Rasch
Lieutenant, 353rd SIS Regt. East,
German Luftwaffe

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Curriculum Vitae

On the 22 March, 1913 I was born in Gladenbach, Hessen-Nassau, the son of Studienrat (educational councillor to the State), Otto Rasch. I spent my youth in Marburg on the Lahn. There I attended the elementary school and after that the Gymnasium. In 1927 my father was transferred to Herne/Westphalia and during the same year we moved there. At Easter time 1931 I passed the "Reifeprüfung" (final state examination). I wanted to become athletic instructor and also took up, at the University in Munster/Westphalia, Mathematics, Physics and Athletics. After two semesters I had to drop my studies for lack of funds. In the unemployment crisis which existed throughout Germany I was unable to find an occupation in keeping with my background.

During the two semesters I took part in the glider practice flights of the student groups and in the course of these I passed the "A" examination. I continued in my hometown to occupy myself with the construction of gliders and later entered the NSFK (National Socialistisches Fliegerkorps). From there I was sent in 1935 to a premlitary navigator course in Essen-Mühlheim. In addition to the regular course, we also completed flights with reconnaissance tasks. Unfortunately it was found by physical examination, that I was not acceptable for flying duty (my eyesight was not good enough), and I had to drop out. November 1936 - May 1937 I took part in a course for radio operators at the aviation training camp in Gelsenkirchen. After completion of this training I could apply for a job in the air force as a civilian employee. In June - July 1937 I completed my first military course in basic training in Detmold, and was promoted to Gefreiten (Pfc.) September 1937 I was placed as SI-radio operator at Receiving Station 14 in Munster.

After a time of familiarizing myself with the RAF traffic, I covered radio traffic on my own. In October I was sent on TD to a station in the Allgau, which had to find out in collaboration with the Munich SI-stations, if and how far England and France were prepared to interfere in the Spanish civil war. November 1937 I returned to Munster. In February 1938 the fixed SI-station in Telgte was completed and the Weather Radio Receiving Station 14 moved there. Besides an out-station in the Eifel, one existed on the island of Borkum, to which I was ordered in spring 1938. There the RAF frequencies 1600 - 1900 kcs were covered and picked up almost free of interference. Later the ground-air traffic of the Bomber- and Coastal Command was also covered. The practice flights of the latter partly with photographic reconnaissance missions up to the Borkum area were monitored and their positions were traced. In 1939 I was assigned to the analysis department and ordered to solve the newly introduced RAF method of giving planes their positions. The coverage of practice flights of the squadrons in Southern England and the Channel area soon made the solution possible. It was found that degrees of longitude and latitude were expressed by two letters and that long. and lat. minutes were in clear figures contracted into a four-figure group, for instance: "mgeb 4624". The change of the letter denominations at the

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beginning of the war and further changes were immediately solved without difficulties. The giving of positions of English planes and the intercepting of transmissions of D/F results on the frequency of 340 kc were absolutely sufficient, at that time, to trace their flight path without any D/F basis of our own.

In 1939 the weather radio net control stations (Wetterfunkleitstelle) were set up as liaison from the SI-stations to the Luftflotte Headquarters. I was sent to the W-Leit 2 (Weather Radio Station), which was set up by the SI-station in Telgte and transferred later to Luftflotte 2 in Braunschweig. 1939 I spent in Gressendorf with the air signal battalion, my second military period, and upon completing this training I was promoted to sergeant and nominated as ROA (reserve officer candidate).

In the summer of 1939 I participated in two flights in a Zeppelin. The flights went over northern Germany into the northern part of the North Sea, in order to search for VHF beacons and traffic of the RAF. The flights showed no results in this respect, because the RAF did not use VHF at that time.

The deciphering of the "Syko" code, a reciprocal 32-column-Caesar, which was newly introduced by the RAF in the ground-air traffic, was unsuccessful, until "Syko" charts were captured from an English plane, shot down at the beginning of the war. After that time the deciphering could be accomplished even when the "Syko" cards of the day were not captured.

Upon the outbreak of war I was active at W-Leit 2 in the analysis of ground-air traffic. Besides the tracing of the path of flight by intercepting the messages of the English ground stations giving positions of their planes, we succeeded in establishing the composition and deployment of the five Bomber Groups of the RAF and at the same time in learning the scope of their strength by analysis of the "serial numbers".

In May 1940 I was sent to a Detachment of the ONW at Varna in Bulgaria, with the mission of identifying the radio traffic of the RAF in the Middle East. The radio organization of the RAF in Egypt, Palestine, and Iraq was clarified at this time. Here for the first time the radio traffic between Takoradi and Cairo, the starting point and terminus of the ferrying route (Ueberfuehrungsrouten) across Africa, was found. The analysis of this traffic made it possible, to observe the strength and deployment of the RAF and the transports from America to the Middle East. At the end of 1940 the Kommando (Detachment) was transferred from Varna to an out-station of the W.z.b.V. in Constanza/Romania.

My stay in Bulgaria, where the interests of Germany and Russia collided, made it clear to me that Europe would turn Bolshevist, if Europe could not be made to collaborate, in one form or another, under the leadership of Germany.

In November 1940 I was called for military service, but remained in the same job. In February 1941 I was sent to the 9. Radio Intercept Co. of the Air Signal Rgt. 4 in Sofia/Bulgaria. There I took charge of the analysis of the intercepted RAF radio traffic of the Middle East. This traffic was joined later by the Expeditionary Air Force of the RAF in Greece.

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Before the start of the Russian campaign the Company for the SI-operation against the Soviet Union was retrained and from then on remained committed in the East. With this company I participated in the advance of the German troops into the Caucasus. We went through Bessarabia by way of Nikolajew, Marimpol to Kislowodsk in the vicinity of Mt. Elbrus and in the beginning of 1943 back again to Marimpol. During this time I was active mostly in traffic analysis (Betriebsauswertung).

November 1942 I became a Lieutenant. After a short period of service in the "Truppendienst" (Company Officer), I was sent to a Kommando (Detachment) as an analyst in February 1943, for the purpose of observing the Russian Air Force in the Northern area of the Caucasus from Bupatoria in the Crimea. The mission was a complete success and it was possible at any time to inform our own units about composition, deployment and strength of the Russian air force formations opposite us. Intercepted orders for action could be transmitted to our own positions in time, and attacks could be successfully repelled. Once it was possible by this method to shoot down 7 out of 11 attacking Russian bombers "IL-2".

From July 1943 on I took charge of the 9th Company of Air Signal Rgt. 4 in place of the C.O. who was absent, and was active as final analyst (Endauswerter) in the analysis section of the III./Air Signal Rgt. 4. The favorable deciphering conditions and the lively radio traffic of the Russian air force formations in the Southern area brought important intelligence reports for our own command until the end of the war and gave a clear picture of the development of the Russian Air Force, as well as of its composition and strategic concentration. The Russian Air Force concentrations allowed well founded conclusions to be drawn as to where the Russians would strike next.

In the summer of 1944 I took charge of the observation of the Russian long-range bomber formations in the southern area of the Eastern Front and occupied this post until the end of the war.

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Wilhelm P. von Lachum
 Lieutenant, 353rd SIB Regt., East,
 Luftwaffe

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21 June, 1945

Curriculum Vitae

14.11.1909 Born in Duisburg, grew up there with 6 brothers and sisters. Father was manufacturer Heinrich von Lachum.

1929 Abitur (final state examination) at the Oberrealschule in Duisburg

1941 Married to Ilse Bernards from Duisburg, 1 child

1930 - 1933 Business practice in the Siemens Concern

1933 - 1935 Study at the School of Business Administration

1938 - 1941 Study of international trade relations at the Berlin World Economic Society

15.4.1930 - 1.4.1933 Business course at Siemens, Essen

1.4.1935 - 15.9.1936 Correspondent at Osram GmbH., Kon.Ges., Essen

15.9.1936 - 1.4.1938 Central sales administration at Osram, Berlin

1.4.1938 - 11.11.1939 Commercial agent for Osram, Berlin, for the territories of Berlin and the Eastern Mark Brandenburg

11.11.1939 - 1.12.1939 Familiarization with new activity in the main administration of Osram, Berlin

1.12.1939 Trade agent of Osram for cooperation with the authorities of the Reich and the industrial and trade organizations

15.1.1942 - 12.4.1942 Basic recruit training at 15. Co./Air Signal Rgt. 4 in Reichenbach in the Eulengebirge

13.4.1942 - 16.7.1942 Radio intercept training at 17. Co./ Ob.d.L. in Kladow, Berlin

17.7.1942 - 19.5.1943 D/F evaluation and traffic analysis at the W-Leit 1, Riga

20.5.1943 - 7.7.1943 H.C.O. school in SegevoId (Latvia)

6.7.1943 - 16.11.1943 Traffic analyst at 14. Co./Air Signal Rgt. 1 (formerly W-Leit 1), Riga.

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20.11.1943 - 8.3.1944	Officer school in Badgyn (Poland) and battles against partisans
9.3.1944 - 16.7.1944	Traffic analyst and Referatsleiter at 1. Co./ Air Signal Rgt. 353 (formerly 14/I), Riga
20.7.1944 - 14.10.1944	War School 13, Halle/Saale
1.10.1944	Promotion to Lieutenant
15.10.1944 - 16.1.1945	Traffic analyst and Referatsleiter at 1/353 in Kreuzburg, East Prussia
17.1.1945 - cessation of hostilities	Traffic analyst and Referatsleiter at 7/353 in Kottbus and Dessau
10.3.1945	Adjutant in addition to other duties at II.Bn./ Air Signal Rgt. 353.

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June 21, 1940

Wilhelm F. von Lachm
Lieutenant and Adjutant of
II/INR. 353

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Biography

I was born on November 14, 1909 in Duisburg, the center of the Rhine-Ruhr industrial area, and attended school in this city until passing my "Abitur" examination. During my school career I, together with other comrades, established the idea of a student Rowing Team which, up to the time of my examinations, had shown a gratifying upward trend. I and my six brothers and sisters could thank the intellectual freedom then prevailing in Germany for an education which gave us a glimpse into the interests of the common people of this earth. The pronounced tolerance of the population of my native city, while conservatively clinging to its own faith, later imbued us also with the ability to adhere to this principle. Although I joined the Party in 1933 I could never hold office because I refused to renounce the Roman Catholic Church.

The economic depression which set in in 1929 forced my father to sell real estate which had belonged to our family for a hundred years, in order to retain his factory engaged in the manufacture of bridges, engines, and other apparatus. For this reason I gave up my intention of studying law, and after my "Abitur" examination, entered my father's business in order to receive there a technical commercial training. Along with my brothers, who upon completing their technical studies were slated for the management of the business, it was intended that I should later take over the business administration. For personal reasons I then decided, however, not to take my training in my father's business, and on April 15, 1930, I went over to the Siemens Company where I received a thorough and varied training. After completing this training I was given a two years leave of absence to attend a business college.

After my return I worked in the largest European incandescent lamp factory belonging to the Siemens Company, the Osram Company in Berlin, where the work proved so very fruitful to me that my entry into my father's firm was not realized. Owing to the recovery in export trade with Europe and overseas countries which occurred in increasing measure after the year 1933, it was unfortunately impossible for me to work abroad and thereby perfect my knowledge of languages, and also study business life in foreign countries. I regretted this very much. At the same time the new construction program within Germany gave a decided lift to business. The intervention of the Government in business life placed new tasks before us, which were no less interesting because it became a matter of protecting to a great extent one's freedom of movement and decision. I witnessed these struggles at first hand, while actively occupied in the sales department of my business. With the outbreak of war I had to cease my selling activities and was commissioned by my firm to take over the matter of our cooperation with the government authorities and the organization for industrial management ("Reichsgruppen" and Wirtschaftsgruppen"), as well as assisting in the maintenance of

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existing international trade agreements, especially those with the "General Electric Company" in New York, the "Companie des Lampes" in Paris, and the "Phoebus S.A." in Geneva, which were the legal representatives of the interests of all the incandescent lamp manufacturers joined together in international agreements. The accomplishment of these tasks was made very difficult by the attitude of the government following the triumphant conclusion of the campaign in the West. Only after long delay did we comply with the government's order to liquidate international agreements as it was never the wish of German industry to give up its profitable cooperation with the great industries of incandescent lamp manufacturers. There also existed (following the termination of the treaty) verbal agreements among important personalities of the individual agencies not to change for the time being the hitherto crystallized basis, since on all sides there existed the wish to return to the former status after the end of the war. The German government always endeavored to support the industries which were members of cartels, since these were in the foremost position to supply the market with quality merchandise at so-called "popular prices" (Volkspreisen). In the early stages of the war this friendship toward the cartels took the form of an order for the establishment of jointly-owned factories. Among these cartels are those which accepted new members and made available to even the most insignificant firm the experiences of the largest members, at the same time guaranteeing a minimum turnover. Thus was founded the "German Incandescent Lamp Association", by order of, and under the auspices of the gentlemen of the German Ministry of Commerce. I worked under this set-up, keeping in mind the interests of the society's largest member, my firm, until I was called into the military service in January 1942. This work gave us a great deal of vexation and was very nerve-wracking. If the war had ended successfully this association would have suppressed all private initiative within the incandescent lamp industry; on the other hand, it would have made "popular prices" really possible.

Military Career

I was never a soldier before being called into the military service on January 15, 1942. After completing my three months' basic training, which included an introduction to the theoretical and practical side of radio in Reichenbach in the Buelengebirge, I was trained at Kladow, near Berlin, for the SIS opposing Russia and have been assigned to that service since July 1942. My first station was the Intercept Evaluation Company of the 1st Luftwaffe Signal Regiment in the Luftflotte 1 area, with its headquarters in Riga (Latvia); this unit had been working on the Russian air forces on this sector of the front. Later this company, together with the intercept communications and D/F companies, and out-stations, was incorporated into Radio Intercept Regiment 355, commanded by Colonel Hans Bick.

My initial job was that of D/F plotter. The SIS in the Northern sector had a very good base-line at its disposal. About 12 direction-finders (HF D/F's), distributed along the entire arc of the front from Finland

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to the Black Sea, worked exclusively for the intercept company of the SIS. After a few months of familiarization and study of the organization of the SIS, I, together with other comrades, perfected a new D/F control net-work which proved itself and allowed us to steer many direction-finders in unison. In this way better and more numerous bearings were obtained, which made possible more accurate plots. Following my promotion to acting corporal on January 1, 1943, I was made chief of D/F plotting in February, this in spite of my lowly rank. This work ended for me on April 20, 1943, when I was sent to a non-commissioned officers' training course at Segewold Castle in Idvland (Latvia).

In November of the same year I completed an officers' training course in Budzyn near Lublin in Poland, and I finished at the head of my class. In spite of my rather considerable age of 35 years, which contrasted greatly to that of the majority of young participants. We all remained in Budzyn another two months for service against the partisans. During this period it remained very quiet there and relations between the students of the training course and the local Polish population were good. The Poles manifested a strong aversion to the Russians, and dreaded occupation by them. In our battling with Polish Bolshevik partisans we continually received kindly assistance from intelligent Poles who themselves had suffered from this evil.

The Polish population was essentially better fed than we, and the people demonstrated their friendliness in many ways through their hospitality, which we could never accept to the extent that it was offered. In the local shops with which I became acquainted during my stay, there were many kind of wares to be bought, which in Germany had disappeared from the scene since the outbreak of war, or else were rationed as critical items. In general, the life did not give one the impression that there was still a war going on. Numerous theatres, movies and taverns, peace-time menus, well-dressed people thronging clean streets, rich displays in shop-windows, a well-functioning traffic system, books and newspapers from many European countries placed on sale, and complete freedom of movement; all these things made sojourns in the Polish cities pleasant. From Cracow to Kovel I was able to travel in the dining-car of a regular express train. I dined in a sumptuous manner with my comrades, without for even a second thinking that this train was moving in the direction of the front. The intelligent Poles understandably wished themselves back in a free and independent Poland, and lived under the nightmare of the Bolshevik peril, which at that very time became intensified owing to the withdrawal of German troops to Warsaw. I became convinced that with the end of the war and the final solution of the Polish question, the German occupation troops would like to protect Poland from Bolshevism.

I received the same impressions during my stay in Latvia. During the two years (with certain interruptions) that I lived in this country, I did not get to know a single Latvian family, which under Russian rule, had not suffered the loss of a member of the family either through death or deportation. The friendship between the German occupation troops and the Latvian population was cordial and sincere on both sides. Life in the Latvian capital Riga, was decidedly normal. I spent wonderful evenings at the Latvian opera in Riga, and was delighted by the magnificent voices of the singers, as well

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* While at the beginning of the Russian campaign the solution of these problems was relatively simple, from the time of the battle of Stalingrad the difficulties increased daily. The Russians, always known as good chess-players and mathematicians, now began to make life very difficult for us. Although we often had to start anew each day, we were in a position to give to the Headquarters, early in the morning, a complete picture of the enemy situation.

* All radio procedure was seldom changed at one time, and therefore when changes occurred in call-signs, frequencies, codes, etc. there were still some characteristics by which the enemy networks could be re-established. A number of good intercept operators could recognize unhesitatingly the enemy networks, simply by the Russian operators' style of sending, without any other indication. At the outbreak of the Russian campaign against Finland in June 1944 we were able to determine two days before the battle near Viborg began, through the medium of the take-off and landing messages of the Russian pilots, that entire flying units had moved from the Leningrad front to this new sector. These predictions were based solely on the last names of radio operators and their individual idiosyncrasies in "sending".

The work of traffic analysis could only be handled by specialized personnel who had an outstanding memory and unimaginative patience. Only the type persons who, in carrying out their own part of the task did not lose sight of the overall objective of the battalion, could avoid mistakes and guarantee calm deliberation and results. The maxim "accuracy before speed" was applicable.

There was a lively and profitable exchange of ideas between ourselves and comparable units of the Army and Navy Radio Intelligence Services.

In the middle of January 1945 I transferred from the Northern sector of the Eastern Front to the 2nd Radio Intelligence Battalion of the same regiment (MR 353) which was working on the Russian Air Force in the Luftflot-tekmando 6 area, the middle sector of the Eastern Front. Here also I was given charge of traffic analysis, and from the middle of March 1945 I took on the additional duties of adjutant. I held these two posts until the capitulation. The work in the middle sector was new to me only in respect to the radio procedure peculiarities of Russian Air Force units opposing us in that area. In principle I was able to produce the same positive results there and only required a short transition period in which to familiarize myself with this front. I always attached great importance to the principle of working closely together with the R/T evaluation section, and obtained many valuable complements to my own work from the results of R/T analysis.

The transition from civil to military life brought with it many difficult readjustments; similarly the unconditional surrender in May of this year hurled us from this work into a chaos. The war has completely destroyed our homes and my father's factory.

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The last news I had of my parents who were living in Hildfeld in Sauerland was on Christmas, 1944. Meanwhile there had been hard fighting in this area and it was mentioned three days running in the communique of the German High Command. My wife and my daughter are in the Bavarian Allgäu with those possessions left to us. How I will get there and what I will encounter remain to be seen. My bank account and effects are in a bank in Russian occupied territory. If one could liken the ravages of this war to a cyclone, the uproar being over, one can go calmly about the business of reconstruction, so would the German people know how to reconcile themselves to this affliction from God. To-day we still have no solution to the question as to whether a four-fold occupation may in general permit the reestablishment of a normal domestic life. Completely impoverished, the people will be driven into the arms of Bolshevism, which in turn can thus increase its power. If no changes are made in the present lines of demarcation, Italy, France, and also Spain will become the martyrs of this evolution, and no power in the world, no occupation army, will check the peaceful Bolshevizing of the entire European continent.

The future watchword of the Bolsheviks in their propaganda will be "Europe for the Europeans", and behind this will come the steam-roller of terror to crush the peoples of Europe together into a uniform, dull mass. Whoever has seen Russia during this war knows what is in store for us in such an eventuality. Today there are many former German soldiers who know nothing of where their families are, who have no home, no shelter, no clothing, are completely impoverished and without a future, and therefore have nothing more to lose. Is it to be wondered if these men draw nearer to Bolshevism, which alone offers them something?

Here in Bad Kissingen I again willingly take up the work which I helped to develop, and I have every intention of assisting in every way possible, since I am convinced that by doing so I can still render a service to my fatherland.

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Helmut M u c k e, 1st Lt.
Adjutant of II Battalion of SIS Regt. 353 East,
German Luftwaffe.

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22 June, 1945

Biography

Personal

I was born in Bad Leusick (Saxony) on February 13, 1916. My father has had a photographic equipment business in Leipzig since 1928. I have two brothers, one of whom was killed in Russia in 1944, the other probably a prisoner of war in Norway.

I was married in Leipzig in 1941 and have two children, one three, and the other six months old. I have had no news of my family since April.

I did not belong to the Party.

Vocational Training

In 1935, after four years of elementary school and nine years of secondary school, I passed my final examinations, and in 1936 I began the study of physics and mathematics at the University of Leipzig. After three semesters (a year and a half) my studies were interrupted by my being called up for military service. In the winter of 1941 - 42 I received a furlough in order to complete the fourth semester.

I have a superficial knowledge of Latin, French, and Russian, and studied English in school for nine years.

Military Training

After serving in the German Labor Service for six months I was called to Dresden in 1937 to join the Luftwaffe Signal Corps. After basic training and radio training I was transferred to the 21st Weather Receiving Station in Pulsnitz (Saxony). This was the cover-name for an SIS station that at this time was monitoring Czechoslovakia. After a short period of training I was sent to an SI out-station in the Erzgebirge. The strength of this station was 15 soldiers and civilian employees. Our function was the reception of radio traffic and the D/F-ing of it. We knew nothing of the results of this work since it was sent elsewhere to be worked on. In order to better obtain cross bearings our D/F's had a direct telephone line with other D/F stations set up along the border. With the help of the cross bearings the positions and call-signs changes of approximately 20 Czechoslovakian airfields were determined daily. After the march into the Sudetenland our unit set up there and continued work until the remainder of Czechoslovakia was occupied.

We then came back to the garrison in Dresden for several months, and in the late summer of 1939 went to the eastern border near Schleichau and

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Deutsch Krone with the monitoring of Polish traffic as our mission. Here there was only one net-work comprising medium sized airfields, passing as great a volume of traffic as was heard in Czechoslovakia. Reception was good. What results were achieved, we, as intercept and D/F men, could not judge; but I believe that these messages were either not deciphered at all, or were deciphered too late to be of use. The duty roster was so arranged that there were four men to a shift. Later this was reduced to three men.

The campaign in Poland ended so quickly, that I presume the results of the SIS could not be exploited. Nothing in particular was learned from the monitoring of traffic from flying units, with the exception of that of the International Safety Service and several artillery reconnaissance units.

After the march into occupied Poland the monitoring was changed to Russian traffic, for which purpose we were again placed within the framework of the 21st Weather Receiving Station, at first in Lodz, later in Bronberg, and finally in Warsaw. My work was the monitoring of the medium frequency band (200 to 1500 kilocycles) from which only meager results were obtainable. Mobile goniometers were installed as direction-finders and these furnished very good bearings in the daytime. The main intercept task was in the MF band (2000 to 4000 kilocycles) for which as yet we had no D/F apparatus. By this time I was a sergeant and in the fall of 1940 I was detailed to a three months officers' training course at the Luftwaffe Signal School in Halle. Upon my return I was assigned to the headquarters in Warsaw as a traffic analyst. With the beginning of the Russian campaign the unprofitable monitoring of the MF band was allowed to lapse. In Minsk, our first position, the short wave band was covered by some 20 receivers. Results were good (many plain-text messages). However, the number of receivers was not sufficient. In this connection it should be noted that the SIS of the German Army monitored the enemy air force on a larger scale than we did. The SIS of the German Luftwaffe was first called into being in 1937 and was, for example, able for the first time in 1942 to stand on its own in the middle sector of the "Eastern Front" without the guidance of the Army.

There followed a further move to Smolensk. In February 1942, when I returned from my furlough which I had been given for the purpose of study, I was promoted to the grade of Lieutenant and assigned to the work of final evaluation. In the summer the unit was taken over by Major Windels and expanded into a battalion. Our results improved continually, and therefore in the fall the Army discontinued its interception of Russian Air Force traffic.

Following my return from a second abbreviated furlough in 1943 for the purposes of study, I was given the task of organizing the interception of R/T traffic from Russian flying units in the middle sector of the Eastern Front, after this branch of the work in the northern sector had proved successful for several months.

The mission began in Orel with only three interceptors and one evaluator, and after a month's work showed its first results. In the beginning we worked with a Gruppe of the Fighter Geschwader Molders, which in the beginning acted only in a dilatory manner on our information.

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Later the SI out-stations were increased to a strength of about ten interceptors and two to three evaluators; new out-stations set up, and direction-finders installed for them. With this step in the summer of 1943 this branch of the SIS continually increased in significance and for many fighter units was the fundamental director of their activity. The number of fighters available for defense against Russian intruder attacks became increasingly insufficient and therefore, on many occasions, no action was taken on our messages. Several out-stations had as their task the monitoring of R/T from fighters of the Russian Interior Air Defense System, and used these results to successfully warn our own reconnaissance aircraft. Occasionally airborne interceptors flew along on missions, but their work did not come up to the level of the more thorough and voluminous interception on the ground, and was finally discontinued because of losses.

For a year I commanded various SI out-stations in the middle sector and then was ordered back to the battalion in Minsk where I became operations officer from May 1944 on. In this capacity I coordinated the mission of the SI out-stations and D/F's with that of higher headquarters and flying units, and collated the resulting successes in the form of a daily report. In January 1945 I was promoted to 1st Lieutenant. In the course of retreat the battalion moved by way of Warsaw to Germany, where it carried out its task until April 12th, 1945. After that, owing to frequent moves, organized and continuous monitoring was no longer possible. Moreover communications with the numerous SI out-stations located on the "Eastern Front" were cut off.

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Karl Albrecht Major
Lieutenant, 352nd SIS Regt., South,
Luftwaffe

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Curriculum Vitae

7.4.1911	Born in Vienna, son of an officer of World War I and a very high government official
1917 - 1921	Elementary school in Vienna
1921 - 1929	Humanistic Gymnasium in Vienna
1929 - 1933	Studying law at the Vienna University completed by attaining degree of Doctor of Law.
1933	Completed 1 year of law practice.
1933 - 1934	Studied political science at the Vienna University, study completed by Absolutorium
1934	Start of practice as lawyer candidate in a Vienna lawyer's office
1939	Lawyer, own practice
1927 - 1939	Travelled through Holland, Germany, Hungary, Italy.
26.8.1939	Entered the Wehrmacht as radio man; additional training as driver.
Jan. - Feb. 1940	OCS in Vienna
13.3.1940	Transfer to Chd-Stelle d.Ob.d.L. as decipherer
June 1940	Transfer to W-Leit 3, Bougival near Paris as decipherer
1.8.1940	Promotion to Pfc.
Dec. 1940	Promotion to Sergeant
Dec. 1940	Transfer to 9./Air Signal Rgt. 40, Taormina as decipherer
April 1941	Transfer back to Chd-Stelle d.Ob.d.L.
June 1941	Transfer to W-11 Vouliagmeni near Athens, first as decipherer, then from Dec. 1941 on as analyst.

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16.2.1942 - 12.4.1942	NCO school in Athens
1.9.1942	Promotion to Staff Sergeant
16.10.1942	Kriegsverdienstkreuz II Class
19.10.1942 - 21.11.1942	OCS-final selection course in Kifissia near Athens
1.12.1942	Accepted as officer candidate
1.1.1943 - 31.3.1943	In charge of the final analysis of the radio intercept Bn. Sudost
1.4.1943 - cessation of hostilities	I-a radio intelligence of the Bn., later of the Air Signal Rgt. 552 activated by the Bn.
2.10.1943	Kriegsverdienstkreuz I Class
19.10.1943	Promotion to lieutenant (war time officer) as of 1 September 1943

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Lieutenant Karl Albrecht Major
352nd SIS Regt., South,
Luftwaffe

Curriculum Vitae

I was born in Vienna on the 7 April 1911. My father was a World War I Officer and after the war he became a Government Official. My two brothers and I were educated in a Monastery (Humanist Gymnasium). In 1928 I started the study of law at the University of Vienna and received my Doctor's degree in 1933. During my university study I worked as a court assistant in order to complete the required year of practical experience in law work. During this time I also completed a years study of Political Science. After receiving my degree I entered a law firm representing large corporations. While with the firm I specialized in contract work on the motion picture industry and large manufacturing firms, until called up for service in the Armed Forces. When I entered the service the office was closed by order of the President of the High Court of Vienna and since that time I have ceased to practice law.

I travelled extensively before the war in Holland, Germany and Italy. I was married on the 11 October 1940.

Military History

On 26 August 1939 I was called to active duty as a driver. After completing basic training I applied for and received a six week course in OCS reserve. This course was a loss to me as the final records were lost and I could not receive credit for the work that I had completed.

On 13 March 1940 I was transferred to the Chi-Stelle des Ob.d.L. in Potsdam. I was transferred because of my knowledge of languages, mathematics and law. When I arrived in Potsdam I was surprised to find that there seemed to be no security check on the various soldiers brought there from all over Germany to form the deciphering teams on airforce traffic of the enemy. After a short familiarization course in enemy traffic I was put in charge of a group of about forty men composed of Staff Sergeants, Sergeants, and other soldiers. One of the sergeants objected to being under my orders and he was immediately transferred. While with the Chi-Stelle I had the opportunity to learn much of the enemy air force regarding organization and working methods. One of the out-standing successes at this time was the solving of a "Byco" message that enabled us to warn our fighter interceptors of an impending attack on a German harbor and resulted in our fighters being able to intercept and shoot down more enemy planes than had ever been destroyed before that time.

In June 1940 I was transferred with five other members of the crypt-service to "W-Leit 3" near Paris (Bougival) in order to build up another crypt-team. I was also in charge of this team and we held a course on breaking "Byco" messages. We often had to work fifteen to sixteen hours a day to break these messages and in recognition of this work I was promoted

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to Pfc. on 1 August 1940. On 22 December 1940 I was transferred with a group of five to 9/Ln.Rgt. 40 near Taormina (Sicily) in order to decipher the "Syco" and "4-Z" enemy traffic. For the first time the A-2 of the 8 Fliegerkorps visited us and after seeing what we had accomplished he was most helpful and praised us very highly. This in turn raised our morale and we strove to even greater efforts. I was subsequently promoted to Sgt. From the messages we cracked I became much more familiar with the enemy tactical situation and improved my over all knowledge of the enemy air force very much. Our radio operators took an active interest in their work and were very cooperative. We had perfect teamwork and this in turn was directly attributable to discussions held between the crypt-men and the radio men pointing out just what the messages were, what they contained, and how important it was to make as few mistakes as possible in copying the traffic.

During this time we had occasion to cover the traffic of a sea battle (Crete) between the enemy and elements of the Italian Fleet. We were able to read the traffic and advised Rome immediately that many Italian ships were lost, and gave the details of the battle.

We got the first messages of RAF raids on Greek airfields and were able to read them immediately. The Transfer of Aircraft to "Skaramanga" were a great help to solving messages as the word was always spelled out. This in turn gave us a "Crack" on the message and provided us with ten letters of the daily code immediately. Reconstructing the rest of the messages was then a very simple job. The most important aspect of the work was building a complete "Order of Battle" of the RAF including bases in the Mediterranean. This information was of the greatest importance to the A-2 and gave us nearly exact strength and types of enemy planes in the area. We were surprised to learn how small a force the enemy had in the area at that time. In recognition of the success we enjoyed in our work in Sicily I was transferred to Paris and given a special two day pass.

In April I was assigned to the permanent deciphering personnel section of W-10 West in Asnieres near Paris. My work while with W-10 West was the deciphering of 4-Z traffic which had undergone a complete change and presented many new problems. In June 1941 I was transferred to W-14 in Vouliagmeni near Athens and continued to work with "4-Z" and "Syco" messages. At this time I made many friends and enjoyed many social activities through my former connections while in law work. I found the attitude of a great many of the people very congenial and receptive to Germans and many shops displayed pictures of Hitler and conversation was always of the many things Germany and Greece enjoyed in common i.e. Culture, Art, etc. This attitude of the Greeks was completely changed when the Italian and Bulgarian troops entered Greece. There was much friction in political circles and when the Greek request to send her troops against the Bolsheviks was denied this act sharpened the dislike for Germany.

In December 1941 I was relieved of my work as a decipherer by the C.O. (Capt. Peichtner) and was then used in the evaluation section on decisions of operational and analysis of situation reports. I became the direct assistant of Capt. Peichtner and in this work I became acquainted with all phases of evaluation and analysis and gained such valuable experience. I then took

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over the section covering all RAF activity in the "Levante" and in addition I made a report on the U-boat secret harbors and facilities at the secret U-boat sanctuaries.

From the 16th of February 1942 until the 12th of April 1942 I attended an NCO school in Athens and after successfully completing the course I returned to my old position in the company. In addition to my evaluation work I went through all of the old traffic and assembled all of the old operational report material that I could find. This in turn enabled us to make quicker and more complete evaluations for the tactical employment by our airforce A-2. This work was carried on for a long while before actually being submitted to the A-2 as we wanted to be sure of its value and application. On 1 September 1942 I was promoted to Staff Sgt. of the Res. and on the 16 of October I received the Kriegsverdienstkreuz, Second Class. From 19 October to 21 November 1942 I attended a competitive OCS and was accepted for future officer training. Upon return to my organization I prepared an evaluation course based on practical experience and personal contact with specialists in the various fields of the work. I then prepared an explanation on the various technical matters contained in the finished reports and this explanation was attached to all reports. I was also responsible for educational lectures for the radio operators in order that they could be impressed with the importance of speed and extreme accuracy in their work. These lectures were very important as all "A-2" traffic was being passed to Chi-Stelle and extreme accuracy was paramount. (Nov. 1942) - At this time Radio Intelligence was the main source of information and we were leaned on very heavily by the Chi-Stelle.

In going through the traffic of the SI platoon Africa I came across some two figure call-signs. I made a study of this traffic and was able after a month to solve the call-signs and identify them as enemy Aircraft Reporting Service Nets. The stations were located from the Turkish border to Tripoli. This in turn gave us all the information on "Flight Paths" and enabled us to be warned of all allied sorties and especially those being flown from Benghazi. At this time we organized a special instruction team to teach the differences in American and RAF traffic. This team visited all of the intercept companies under us and instructed the radio personnel and crypt-personnel in the technique of identifying the kinds of traffic. This work was of the utmost importance, as the Middle East RAF and the American Air Force were expected to join at any time and being able to distinguish between American and English radio traffic was absolutely necessary.

When this work was finished I concentrated on the enemy Radar Reporting nets and after fourteen days of intensive search and work, I was able to again solve the problem of identification, working procedure and the range of the instruments. This in turn enabled us to route our Recon planes in the best manner and by monitoring the enemy nets, know the air situation. All these reports were sent to CGL Gen. HAFU Chi-Stelle des Ob.d.L. and also to the other intercept units in the south and west so that all knowledge gained on situations was disseminated for immediate use.

In April of 1943 I became operation chief of the battalion and at that time all of the companies ceased individual reporting and submitted their reports to the battalion where I wrote the final report that was sent to

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the headquarters and all other organizations listed on the distribution. I was also responsible for the equipment of the battalion and placement of all radio personnel.

In May of 1943 I represented the battalion at a conference at the Communication Hq. of Luftflotte 2 in Frascati, Italy and later at the Chi-Stelle in Berlin. The conference was on the subject of division of radio cover for all radio intelligence units in the Mediterranean Area. I gained much more helpful information of the work of other SIS-organizations that were represented.

While I was stationed in Athens I interrogated several prisoners of the USAAF and was not able to get much information from them. One man kept answering "Sorry" and another gave his Sqdn and Wing but became suspicious and would not answer further questioning.

In September 1943 I went to Saloniki with the battalion and upon arrival I was given the Kriegsverdienstkreuz 1st Class, and was promoted, by merit and without going to the War College in Halle, to Lieutenant (War Officer).

On the 13th of December 1943 I activated a Meldekopf to trace the Flight Paths of enemy missions. This section was considered one of the most important branches of radio intelligence information and the work and supervision of the Meldekopf came directly under me as Battalion Operations Officer.

In February of 1944 the Battalion moved to Panschowa near Belgrad and shortly after our arrival in Panschowa I left on a trip of inspections and coordination of all radio intelligence matters. My visits took me to the 7th and 8th Pursuit Divisions in Munich, the Chi-Stelle d.Ob.d.L. (Berlin), Meldekopf 1 (Utrecht), Meldekopf 2 (Paris), III Ln. Rgt. 2 (Padua). An unusual fact that I was surprised to learn was that the Air Signal Radio Intercept Rgt. West knew of the preparations for the invasion but did nothing until the very last minute about making a serious effort to use radio communications. All emphasis was on the elaborate wire and cable networks that existed through France. I mentioned our experiences in the south and of how important we had found radio communication.

In June 1944 I attended another conference with the 7th Pursuit Division in Munich; also present were the C.O. of III/Ln. Rgt. 2, C.O. of ZAF, a representative of OEL Gen. Nafu, and a representative of the 8th Pursuit Division. At this time many discussions were held and the responsibility for all flight path tracing of enemy activity in the south was given to my battalion.

In July 1944 I held a lecture at a meeting of A-2's and briefed the A-2 of the Balkan section on all activity in his section pertaining to radio intelligence matters. This was the only meeting, to my knowledge, that required special permission from the OEL Gen Nafu and I have never been able to find out why this special permission was needed unless it was for extreme secrecy, as all participants were forbidden to take notes of any kind. While at the meeting I met another lecturer who was the chief of the Captured Enemy

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Equipment Branch and was able to arrange, through him, a report on allied radio equipment giving all particulars on frequency, power and types of sets being used. This was most helpful to us and helped to solve many problems that we had no answers to until this time.

In September the Battalion moved to Premstätten, near Graz.

In November the Battalion was incorporated into the OKL as, at that time, a reorganization was carried on and other Signal Radio Intelligence Reg'ts were created. At this time my position called for a staff officer and I received three officer assistants while holding the staff job in addition to being appointed Radar Observation Officer Communications Chief, and Equipment Deployment Officer.

From January to March 1945 I instructed personnel on Radio Intelligence matters at an OCS. In April the Reg't moved to Attersee. The cooperation and coordination of the Army, Navy and Air Force Radio Intelligence in the south-east area was extremely good, due to personal contact and conferences between the personnel of the branches concerned. During my activity as A-2 of the battalion while in Greece and Yugoslavia I was called upon numerous times for defending counsel in Courts-Martial trials.

Shortly before Vienna was taken by the Russians I was there for the last time. At the time I was there all had hoped that the U.S. and British would not permit the Russians to take Vienna. We had always anticipated an invasion of Austria from the south, possibly by Airborne Troops.

In spite of the heavy destruction following the air attacks the people always felt that Vienna was not intentionally destroyed but that the residential sections were destroyed purely by accident. Due to the bitter fighting not many people were able to leave Vienna and to my knowledge my relations are still there. I don't suppose a war between Russia and America will come in the near future although many Germans have hoped that such might be the case. The Russian influence will make many converts because of the subtle manner in their propaganda methods. This influence is also strengthened by the economic strangle in which Germany finds itself, due to the occupational boundaries.

I am convinced that I will succeed in the new Austria in my profession as a lawyer.

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Martin Ludwig **TOP SECRET**
 Lieutenant, Referat B of the Chi-Stelle
 Luftwaffe

23 June 1945

Curriculum Vitae

I. Personal Data

38 years old, married, 4 children
 Born on 21 April 1907 in Leipzig as son of Otto Ludwig and his wife
 Marta nee Fritzsche. Has two sisters.

Occupation before the war:

Independent merchant, partner of the firm Chr. Garmas, sale of heating
 stoves, cooking stoves, cooking installations and frigidairs.

II. Schooling and Professional Education

1913 - 1921 elementary school in Leipzig
 1921 - 1924 commercial school in Leipzig
 1921 - 1924 merchant's apprenticeship to Otto Freyberg, exposition
 building and textile business. Further professional
 education through courses of merchant youth association
 DHV (union).

III. Professional Career

1924 - 1928 active as warehouse man, correspondent, salesman or
 stenographer in various firms in Leipzig, Halle, Bleich-
 rode/Harz, Erfurt, Hamburg and Dresden. When the chances
 for advancement in a firm were bad he looked for other
 possibilities, until
 1929 he went to a big export firm in Dresden (Zeiss Ikon) as
 foreign correspondent and later on behalf of this firm
 went abroad.
 1929 - 1932 active in establishments of his firm abroad (Paris and
 Algiers). The time in Paris was spent getting familiar
 with the business-routine.
 In Algiers responsible for a bigger warehouse for
 delivery. Worked with the clientele in French North
 Africa together with the French representative. After
 successful beginning forced to return to Dresden due to
 the world economic depression (restrictions for im-
 porting certain goods).
 1933 Entry into the business of father-in-law, the firm
 Chr. Garmas, heating - and cooking stoves. First as em-
 ployee, later as partner. The firm was at that time in
 financial difficulties. By energetic work the turnover
 was increased from approximately 80,000 Marks in 1933
 to over 400,000 Marks in 1938. The firm was freed from

^{*)} Deutscher Handels Verein.

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debts. Capital began to accumulate. Trade in new articles was taken up. Business was moved into a bigger sales room in the center of town.

IV. Military Career

December 1936 - February 1937 and August 1938 - October 1938, each time one short training period with Anti-Aircraft Rgt. 10, Dresden.

August 1939 - June 1940

Cannoneer, later chief of section with Anti-Aircraft Rgt. 23, in the Air Defense Zone West, later participated in the Western campaign.

June 1940

Transfer to Radio Intercept Service, Chi-Stelle d.Ob.d.L., Referat 3, Potsdam-Marstall. Referat 3 covered radio traffic in France and main occupation was translation of captured French documents. Later the coverage of de Gaulle radio traffic began.

December 1940 - June 1941

At "Wo 313" (out-station of W 13, Munich-Oberhaching) in Palermo/Sicily, later Taormina.

Mission: Coverage of radio traffic in Africa of de Gaulle and also Vichy. Principally Weygand traffic, as secession of Weygand from Vichy was suspected. Later took over observation of Malta, from a Co. transferred to Greece.

June 1941 - April 1942

Again with Referat 3 of the Chi-Stelle d.Ob.d.L. in Potsdam. The Referat covered now, besides the de Gaulle traffic, mainly all allied radio traffic in the Mediterranean. Final operational analysis of the knowledge gained by the radio receiving stations in Greece, Italy and Munich for use by the *Lw. Fuehrungsstab* (Operations Staff of the Air Force). Own work: To shed light on the convoy and ferrying flights (American supply) from Takoradi - Fort Lamy, Khartoum - to Cairo.

April 1942 - March 1945

Transferred to Chi-Stelle d.Ob.d.L. Referat 2 (later Referat B) to take charge of analysis. Stationed: Asnières/Oise (near Paris) later Limburg, Germany. Main tasks of the Referat: Directing the efforts of radio intelligence against England proper. Assignment of missions among the units in Norway and in the West according to the exigencies of the operations staff (*Fuehrungsstab*) of the *Luftwaffe*. Final operational analysis of the traffic, dissemination to other branches of the *Wehrmacht*, to *GHQ* and to *Dulag*. Originally the Referat was separated into *R/S*, *W/S* and *D/S* plotting and Final Analysis. Later it was changed into sections according to the organization of the enemy Air Force. For instance there was a subsection for *RAF Bomber*

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Command, 8th Air Force, 9th Air Force, etc., and in each subsection were section operators for special areas, for instance IX TAC, XIX TAC, etc., who brought all the material, gained through R/T, W/T, D/F, captured material, statements of PW's etc., together and passed it on the final result.

My own occupation was to clarify the cooperation of the Air Force, and Ground Forces (coverage of the maneuvers in England, Army Cooperation Command of the RAF, later Tactical and Air Support Party-maneuvers, 9th Air Force, Tactical Air Force, ARAF, Invasion).

After the retreat from France I went with an experimental mission from Limburg with a small team at 5. Panzer AOK (Army Command) for immediate analysis reports of the traffic (especially VHF - R/T XIX TAC - air support parties) to be passed to the Army. On account of the good results of this experiment such teams were introduced along the whole Western Front.

Officer's Career

A great delay had been occasioned through transfer from the Anti-Aircraft to the Signal Unit and other frequent transfers. 1941 promoted S/Sgt. November-December 1941 attended OCS in Potsdam. School did not count after that on account of change of the C.O. Irritated about this, so attended no more service schools, until in November 1943, when I was ordered by Lt.Col. Friedrich to return to school (November 1943 - January 1944 at Air Signal Rgt. West). October 1944 promoted to Lieutenant as of 1 April 1944.

April 1945 - May 1945

To make use of the experience, gained in the West and South, transfer came through in March 1945 to Referat C., located from beginning of April together with 25/352 (Rgt.-analysis) in St.Georgen (Attergau).

Due to the breakdown of the German Army, planned work was not possible anymore.

V. Various

Due to home, school and a teacher, who was an enthusiastic follower of Bismarck, I was educated as a Christian National.

By education and my own experiences during the many disturbances and strikes in my home-town of Leipzig, I felt a complete intolerance of Communism.

I entered the merchant youth association in the DEV (youth union). With this association participated in many hikes and social and educational events (theatre, music, singing). The association asked for abstinence (Alcohol, Nicotine) and was part of the so-called "Buenische Jugend", which practised avoidance of the surfeited humanity of the big city, but encouraged "Back to Nature" etc. To represent the ideals of the "Buenische" youth in the new epoch of National-Socialism he took charge of an

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"Unterbann" of the Dresden Hitler youth in Spring 1933. The aim of the DHV was voluntary obedience, exemplary living, frequent hikes, camping in tents, and opposition to military education in the H.J. This "Buendische" point of view was disapproved and fought against by other circles. During the Roehm purge I was arrested without any given reasons. Through intervention of my father-in-law, who went straight to the representative of the Fuehrer (Hess), I was freed from arrest without a hearing. Gestapo declared: Mistaken identity. Financial restitution was made. From this time on I refused to accept public office.

Was member of NSDAP (National Socialist Party) because the goals of this party were also my own: United Germany, improvement of the middle class, work and bread for the masses. Disliked various points and methods, but shared opinion of other comrades that soon a more sensible development would follow.

Through bombing attacks on Dresden in February 1945 my business was a total loss. Parents' apartment and in-law's house were a total loss. Own apartment partly damaged.

After that my wife and 4 children (2 daughters, 2 sons, ages 4-11) evacuated to a village near Freiburg, Saxony. Since the end of February 1945 no news from the family.

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1 September, 1945.

Gert Schlottmann
 Technical Sgt., SIS Reft., South,
 Luftwaffe SIS.

Curriculum Vitae

16.2.1913	Born in Berlin, the son of Dr. Rudolph Schlottmann.
1919 - 1922	Attended private school in Berlin.
1922 - 1931	Attended gymnasium and passed "Matura" examination. During this period visited Belgium, France and Sweden.
1931 - 1932	Studied law, economics and fine arts at the University of Graz. Travelled in Italy, Hungary and the Balkans.
1932 - 1933	Continued studies at the University of Edinburg. Travelled in England, Scotland and Wales. Also visited Sweden for three months.
1933 - 1937	Pursued further study at the University of Berlin. Active in international academic co-operation.
1937 - 1939	Served law clerkship in the courts of Berlin and metropolitan vicinity. Was secretary of the German-British Society. Travelled frequently to Great Britain.
August, 1939	Performed recruit training in the field artillery, German Army.
1939 - 1941	Junior executive in the German Foreign Ministry.
1941 - 1942	Radio voice interceptor at SIS station in Taormina, Sicily.
1942 - 1945	R/T evaluator at W-Leit 2, Italy; later with the evaluation company of the SIS Regiment, South.
Early 1945	Attended officers' candidate school in Weimar.
1935 - 1941	Member of the National Socialist Party.

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Tech. Sergeant Gert Schlottmann
SIS REGIMENT 352, SOUTH

1 September 1945.

Curriculum Vitae

I was born on 16 February 1913 as the elder son of a civil servant of Berlin. At the age of six I was sent to a private school at Lichterfelde, and in 1922 changed over to the local Real-Gymnasium. During the war my father served as a captain and had been absent from Berlin throughout the war except for occasional furloughs. When he was recalled, late in 1917, and appointed a Geheimrat he was still totally absorbed by his work in the Ministry of Economics. To my younger brother and myself he was a sort of Sunday guest, who even then worked at home save for the traditional morning walk with us which he never missed. So my mother, whose delicate health had always caused anxiety in the family, was given the difficult task to look after the two of us.

All this fundamentally changed when, in 1922 or 1923, my father was sent home owing to the government efforts to "economise", as it was put. Thus he had at his best age to face a problem which under normal circumstances presented itself to the average civil servant at an age of sixty or sixty-five: to be without work. The general depression which followed the war hardly allowed him to hope for some other job and to make up for the considerable reduction of his salary. After revolution and civil war, inflation had come and most severely affected the German middle class. The small savings which had been made for the future were reduced to nothing. I believe that this impoverishment of the German middle class was one of the main causes for the deplorable fact that in the years to follow personal initiative and sense of responsibility became a rare quality. I still remember that during this period of rapid devaluation it was one of my tasks to go twice a day to the bank and get my father's salary which was immediately spent for the purchase of food.

At about the same time, Dr. Wilhelm Cuno, a former colleague of my father's, was appointed chancellor of the first national government after World War I. It was he who financed with government loans the so-called passive resistance movement created to counteract French occupation of the Ruhr Territory. This occupation was not provided for in the Versailles Treaty, and therefore considered to be illegal by a vast majority of Germans. One evening when Cuno was invited to our home he most enthusiastically pleaded for a war against France. It took my father hours to make him drop this plan. Such an undertaking would, no doubt, only have aggravated the situation instead of bringing relief.

This incident clearly shows the general despair which then prevailed, and which was obviously shared by an otherwise cool-blooded man like Cuno, who was known to be neither jingoist nor militarist. Facts like this French occupation,

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or the exclusion of Germany from the League of Nations for years to come, were the cause for an ever-increasing nationalist movement in Germany. Since there was no access or application to an international body, German public opinion in those years easily inclined to drift into war. This fact could hardly be overlooked by anyone who then tried to plead with his countrymen for moderation or co-operation with the outside world. It was certainly felt by Dr. Stresemann, the German Foreign Minister, who was popular in Geneva but had no backing at home.

I myself had to realize it when I returned, in 1926, from a visit to France where my father had found temporary employment. Back in Berlin, my brother and I faced a most decided opposition and even animosity from our classmates, and much the same happened to my mother who was accused by family friends of being "unpatriotic". To travel in France was, in 1926, evidently considered to be something like high treason. Nevertheless, I enjoyed this sojourn thoroughly, and Paris appeared to me in a magic light which ~~it~~ has never dimmed since.

But the peace and joy of my heart soon received a heavy blow when I began to feel the remnants of that hereditary hatred which had been built up between our two nations like an invisible wall - not so much by the last war but by education and propaganda. It was there when, at table, I was told not to speak up in German since that was not appreciated, or in a shop when people realized that they were selling to a little boche. I still remember with awe that famous picture at the Paris University Church, the Eglise de la Sorbonne, showing "France, God's Soldier" in a wonderful glorification over a battlefield where the last German Emperor and the late Field Marshal von Hindenburg could be seen assassinating a mother and her child. I was profoundly moved by the sight of it, and I believe that incidents like these have had a most decisive effect upon my mind. It was, I believe, the first great conscious impression of my life, and played an important role in my future development, because, from this moment, I developed a deep-rooted detestation of hatred, both in the field of international politics and class-war.

Back in school, I devoted most of my time to the study of foreign languages to which I added Spanish and Swedish. In 1929, I again spent some months in Belgium and France including this time the region of Tours and Alsace-Lorraine, the former German border province. Evidently the colonial methods applied in the administration of the province did not serve to promote any Francophile tendencies amongst the population which had been one of the principal victims of a 1000 years' struggle between our two countries. Whereas Richelieu's classic policy of preventing a German bloc had obviously not changed the original character of the province, public opinion was divided. Some pleaded for setting up a neutral zone stretching from Holland to Switzerland, and including Luxemburg and Alsace-Lorraine. On the other hand, many supported communism since it seemed to offer the only chance for bringing about some sort of home-rule.

In 1930, I spent several months in Sweden with a friend of the family. During numerous visits to mines and other industrial plants, and in my frequent talks, I was strongly impressed by the absence of social warfare which formed in those

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days the characteristic feature of our continental life. In Germany, an artificial boom, brought about originally by the influx of United States loans, was followed by an unprecedented depression of the general economy. Factories and workshops had to close down, and the unemployed increased to about seven millions. Their fate however was very different from that of the British unemployed, whom I had seen in 1929 come over to Ostend for the week end sitting around discussing the latest events of the local hippodrome. The continental worker had hardly any chance to secure an additional revenue apart from his dole, which was too little for living and too much for dying. Their Sunday sport, therefore, was to take part in some street demonstration or mass meeting, which was, as a rule, followed by serious clashes with political opponents. Monday morning papers would then publish the number of fatal casualties, totalling, in 1932, more than 20 killed per Sunday.

My father had, up to 1931 when I was about to leave school, not managed to find a permanent job. So things looked rather bad for my brother and myself who both wanted to study for the bar. When my father advised me to join one of the feudal Students Korps at Tuebingen, I turned down his proposal. Although I was aware of the fact that this practically equalled the possession of an Oxford Blue, and would have safeguarded my future career, I felt that I should not permit the financial sacrifice it meant for the family. Besides, in view of the general depression, I did not intend to mix with a crowd whose ideas and style of living seemed to me foreign and antiquated. Finally, I set my heart on travelling. So I went to Graz University, in Styria, where the mark was worth double its face value. Here the style of living of the Austrian people, that life full of cheerfulness, of music and dreams, in spite of poverty and starvation, the contact with students from all parts of the continent, with artists, with the nobility and the ex-officers of the "Imperial Pensionopolis", as Graz was called, did, I believe, a great deal in shaping my final self, bringing into my life all the southern gaiety of this most charming of German tribes.

Every penny I saved was spent on travels, which included Austria itself, Italy and the Balkan countries. I witnessed the impressive results of centuries of Austrian administration to which the southeast of our continent owes so much. I felt respect and admiration for the marked tradition of government which was then still prevailing among the old Austrian families, and which enabled them to manage their sometimes disastrous fate with an equanimity of spirit. It was very different from the personal ambitions and elbow fights of what were the then leading families in my home town, that had been swept up to Wilhelmstrasse positions and Grunewald villas, and whose only aim seemed to be to secure within the few years or even months given to them as much as possible of earthly fortunes and lucrative positions for themselves and their clan. And I learned the astonishing fact that the old Austrian Empire, with all its antagonistic nationalist movements and many diverging interests, had been governed by a system of so-called interim ordinances, i.e., by compromise and with the help of the amalgamating power of education in the universities and at the Vienna Theresianum.

In the university my interest was principally directed towards questions of international public law, comparative studies of the various systems of con-

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stitutional law, political economy, and, finally, to the finest expression of the human soul: the Fine Arts, to which I had been most competently introduced at an early age by my mother during our frequent visits to view the early Dutch masters at Bruges, Gand and in Paris. From her, who had brought light into my childhood by verse of her own, I have inherited my profound devotion to art, and particularly to music, from which I have ever since derived much vigor and consolation.

As to my immediate future I realized that if things went on as they were, my professional chances were not very promising. There seemed to be no reason for hurry. So I decided to spend another year travelling and applied through the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst for a scholarship to an American university. I received offers from three American universities of which I accepted that of Dartmouth College. Yet two weeks before I was to sail from Bremen I was informed that I could not go owing to financial difficulties in connection with the bursary. At the very last minute Edinburgh University (Scotland) offered a scholarship which I gladly accepted.

The ease of Cowan House, which was my Edinburgh residence for the next three terms, was very different from the general upheaval I had seen on the continent. The Scotch penchant for "leg pulling", which was considered to be almost a national sport, the absence of narrow-mindedness which manifested itself in a deep and human respect of one's opponent, and a general readiness to accept or at least to see the other man's point of view, and, finally, the generous hospitality in which rich and poor equally shared helped me to feel soon at home. There was little social activity in the continental way save games, lectures, occasional meetings of the Edinburgh International Club, or a Student Debate in McEwan Hall. University vacations were filled with touring the Highlands, England and Wales, living with friends in their homes, just being nothing but an ordinary British scholar. Since I spent my days on principle with Britishers only and avoided speaking German I soon began to see their problems and the way they were looking at them.

Edinburgh University in those days united students from all parts of the world including not only the European continent, but the whole of the British Empire and the United States of America. With them I discussed until late at night our common problems trying to find a way to their solution. I believe that these talks, and the many facts therein educed, were the foundation stone of an idea and a plan which ripened through the experience of many other travels and contacts, and have been decisive for my work ever since. They, above all, revealed to me and many others, the interdependence of the social and the international problem, which to my mind cannot be treated separately but are in their substance, one and the same: the problem of living together.

In Scotland with its large industrial districts, the social problem was naturally much in the foreground. Since I was a regular visitor of the Edinburgh alum areas, I soon discovered that social welfare in the United Kingdom was run principally on a private basis by donations and public collections, whereas in Germany a scheme of public social insurance had been started by Bismarok. In view of the fact that Great Britain was one of the richest countries in the world, one could not help deploring the fate of the unemployed and the miserable standard of living of the working class. This applied, I think, particularly to the housing problem, medical

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welfare and care for children and babes. The problem, as I saw it, was considerably ameliorated by the fact that, unlike continental workers, the British working class evidently did not consider it a shame to live under such conditions. Whereas on the continent the problem gave rise to continual riots, the British working man did not seem particularly upset, which may be partly explained by the strange mentality brought about by the Puritans who would rather blame themselves than God - who sent this punishment of poverty - or the government. The average middle-class man would eventually sigh his "Thank God, we managed to avoid a social revolution after the last war". But that, to my mind, did not solve the problem.

I became certain that such a strange working-class mentality, which is unique in the world, made it easy for any government to deal with the masses, but that it could only be maintained as long as foreign ideas, like communism and others, could be withheld from crossing the threshold of the United Kingdom. I shared in the efforts of friends, collecting money during students' "Rag Weeks", and giving concerts in the slums of "Auld Reekie", which left me with the gratifying feeling of having led them away for an hour or so from the sorrows of the day. Yet I saw that charity like this was a poor remedy indeed.

With the educated classes my experience was most comfortable. With them everything seemed to be incredibly safe and sure and reliable. When discussion switched over to "Europe", as they insisted upon calling the continent, I again and again felt that a knowledge of European history, geography, and of the mentality, the problems and the languages of the various nations of Europe, was comparatively meagre even on the part of people in public positions. It was hardly known that Austrians were not a Balkan tribe, that Graz was not in Rumania, and that Czechoslovakia was not a tropical disease. The lack of general knowledge, especially in history, it was explained, was largely due to the fact that European History after 1900 was not taught in schools. So it was practically left to the universities and the press to enlighten public opinion on present European problems.

The fact that educated people knew so much about everything, and yet so little about the real problems of our continent has, I believe, had a most dire effect upon the shaping of our history. In our present world, which is characterized by the dominance of party machinery and industrial cartels, the best means to protect mankind against arbitrariness is comprehensive and thorough knowledge, and far-sighted thinking, since they insure a maximum of sense of responsibility. Continuity and stability, which are so essential a basis for the well being of our modern communities, are unthinkable if they fail to be cultivated. I sincerely believe that many of the unsatisfactory arrangements which exist to-day in the political, economic and social field are the result of a lack of those qualities. The haste of our epoch, which is not a casual by-product but an essential feature of the times, and often by itself insures the effectiveness of certain measures, only accentuates the importance of this meditation.

Yet, how sparingly these qualities were to be found, not only abroad but in my own country. How willingly did and do men submit to the decision of superior bodies made in their own name. A striking example represents the account of a British Member of Parliament that in the case of a division of "minor importance" in the House of Commons the individual M.P. often does not care to know what he is voting for. He submits to the party machinery in the same way as his German colleague,

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in the Reichstag did, who would by an independent vote risk the party ban because of breach of party discipline. Where does the principle of joint responsibility, then, come in if all responsibility rests with some executive committee before whose decision the experience of a life spent in all parts of the world must be silent?.

The picture which presented itself in those days to a student of European history was this: a densely populated continent, short of ten million tons of corn per annum, whose population surplus had again caused explosions; whose political boundaries and economic potential had for centuries been an object of power politics and not of bilateral agreement; and whose nations were haunted by a selfish and narrow-minded nationalism.

In my discussions at Edinburgh it became clear that a lasting solution of these and all the other most differentiated problems could not be achieved by continuous battling of the various groups of interest, but solely through agreement based on the idea of balance, and through material sacrifice for this purpose. Moreover, a comprehensive education of the European mind, i.e., a pacification from within, would have to be started. Since there can be no lasting peace without understanding, and no understanding without knowledge, it becomes necessary to rescue the "European Idea" from that vague and sanguinary ideology into which it had been misled. A faith in the necessity of a strong and united European community would have to become the creed of the young generation; for it alone was gifted with the power of belief and conviction, and the readiness for sacrifice, which were indispensable for breaking the overwhelming resistance with which it was to meet.

It was quite obvious that the remedy did not lie in the capitalist ideology, inasmuch as it was based on the principle of conflicting interests and rigid pursuance of one's own advantage. Although, beyond any doubt, we owed to capitalism many fine cultural and technical achievements, it would have to be radically modified by a feeling of responsibility towards the whole of mankind in the sense that the future of all communities, national or international, seems to be safeguarded only if all its members are strong and fit for life. A regeneration of our national homelands, as well as that of Europe as a whole, was therefore to be based on the principle of "One for all, and all for one".

On the other hand, communism which was growing rapidly did not seem to be the appropriate instrument for the preservation of European culture and civilisation. Communism, in fact, represented a genuine and therefore most formidable idea. It appealed to both the mind and heart of the masses of all continental countries with the exception of the United Kingdom. It controlled powerful mass movements in all countries, educating the masses in an anti-capitalist spirit. But the weight of its menace, in the conception of many Europeans, did not lie in its threat to capitalism, but in its decided negation of the most basic elements in our life: God, nation and the family.

Whereas in England one single member represented the communists in the House of Commons, the German communists then counted more than seven million voters. After its final failure during local riots in Thuringia and Munich, the movement was evidently preparing to seize power on a large scale, which would eventually bring it to "England's boundary on the Rhine". In France, the general tendency was such

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the same. In Spain, communism rose for its final battle, the winning of which could not be doubted save for the intervention of foreign powers. Already one could see without much imaginative power the extension of the Russian orbit to the Atlantic. Whereas the middle class tried to persuade itself that communism was a thing with which the police could successfully cope, it was evident, especially to the younger generation, that it really aimed at the incorporation of the European continental annex into the Asiatic World. And in view of the inability of the European governments to solve the existing economic and social problems, in view furthermore of the fascinating power of the communist idea and the effectiveness of its methods, there could be no doubt as to who would win. If communism were to succeed it would wipe out the spirit and the culture of this continent, destroying thereby the roots of its strength. To those who wanted to create a European family of nations communism was therefore the enemy number one.

Europe was at this stage suffering from a severe disease of which national jingoism and class hatred were the main symptoms. The post-war treaties had not, as might have been expected, brought relief, but by their playing about with provinces and minorities, created a Europe which was unable to live on herself, Poland and Czechoslovakia receiving political loans from France, France getting under the Dawes and Young Plans money from Germany as reparations, and Germany constantly being preserved from starvation by US loans which she could obviously not repay.

Only Great Britain and the former neutral countries seemed to carry on well. The former, however, to which all continental countries looked up for help and guidance, was tied down by her traditional policy of the balance of powers. She was certainly not going to take the lead in the social field but preferred to muddle through, making occasional adjustments, and wishing to pursue the same policy, if necessary, in the international field. Much for the same reason, that European generation which had fought the war was either not willing or unable to bring about a fundamental change. They, too, would rather yield to pressure and try to find a compromise than make a substantial sacrifice in favor of a great cause. They were most seriously prejudiced towards the two main problems of Europe, and were either anxious to preserve what they had, or possessed by an unconditional spirit of revenge.

The final solution could evidently only be brought about by those who equally abstained from class hatred and jingoism, who were unprejudiced and idealistic enough to see other men's problems, and willing to find a solution at the price of sacrifice. Europe could only overcome her mortal disease by a joint effort of her youth, by a long-term policy towards a union from within, and not one which was forced upon her.

These meditations show by themselves that war as a means of politics was the most unsuitable instrument in the pursuance of that great task which lay before us. War would not only create new problems, but at the same time lay open all the wounds of the past; it would stir up hatred and despair and revive the idea of revenge, the deadly foe of a unionist movement. Finally, war would demand the sacrifice of our best, and destroy any immediate hope for a better future. Such were our meditations, and such was our plan, which exercised a lasting influence

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upon my own life and work, and that of many of my friends in the years to follow.

We were aware of the difficulties which lay before us. In Austria, I saw what the Viennese socialists had achieved. They had tackled the housing problem by erecting enormous blocks of flats and modern schools. It seemed to be the right way. But talking to the people inside one learned that the entry of possession into their lives had not changed their minds in the least. There was still that feeling of being outlawed instead of the sense of responsibility; the isolationist attitude of the have not instead of the joy of possession. Obviously, there had been no corresponding education going on with it. The plan had been operated by materialists who thought to solve the problem by giving the working man something to play with. Certainly, the question was not quite so simple as that. To lead him back into community life, to make him feel one with the rest of the nation, required infinitely more than could be done by money alone. It required strong hearts to educate and touch and raise him. They, however, were apparently missing. So the end of the experiment was the transfer of the housing blocks into fortified castles with machine guns in every window, a rise of the masses which had to be stamped out by the Austrian Army.

The example clearly indicates that a failure like this is unavoidable also in the international field if the idealistic is being neglected. The material obstacles on our road to a New Europe could only be removed if an education of the mind, of public opinion towards that goal, is being pursued at the same time. This aim would have to be achieved by the continuous contact and co-operation of those in whose hands power would be placed to-morrow: the youth.

On the other hand, the unique importance of the material side of the problem was revealed in Germany where various liberal governments, some well-known politicians, university professors and influential societies tried to educate German public opinion in an international spirit, to conquer it for the idea of Pacifism. It was, after the terrible disaster of World War I, a most fascinating and powerful idea. And yet it failed. The many promising endeavors were frustrated by the fact that there was no material contribution from outside allowing even these governments to establish peace and order internally. The application of liberal methods in the field of economics did not enable them to make up for the substantial losses, inflicted by the Versailles Treaty, of valuable agricultural areas in the east and of important mining districts in the west. The system of free competition did not allow solution of the unemployment question, which might have offered the possibility to throw unused labor into the scale by increasing national production and export. That is why Germany presented herself, in the end, to the outside world, as an always insolvent debtor, whereas internally an economic and political chaos manifested themselves in frequent strikes, bankruptcies of important old firms, and suicide waves.

As a result of these shortcomings, socialist tendencies were favored within governmental circles as well as with the masses. "Planning" and "state initiative" were held to be the only methods to cope with the situation, and the two socialist parties in opposition accounted for one electoral success after the other. Their programs included all shades of state interference from the "leadership of the state" to "nationalization" of whole industries, or even abolition of private ownership.

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It is, I believe, important to note that although our liberal parties did not favor such plans, they were, if carried into government positions, forced to resort to most drastic measures, including the continual application of special powers to which the President of the Reich was entitled in a "state of emergency" by article 48 of the Constitution (martial law, dissolution of Parliament, ban on political parties, papers and public speeches, etc.).

State control was gradually extended to all spheres of life. In the end, it not only included price control, wages and production, but also penetrated into the most remote fields of public and private enterprise. And with the rise of state control grew the number and size of public agencies and the inefficiency of the employees used for exercising that control. As a French friend of mine warned already in 1931, the paradoxical situation finally arose that Liberalism in Germany, by resorting to drastic measures of the above mentioned kind, paved the way for the totalitarian state.

As to my studies at Edinburgh University, I should just like to mention that I took up again international public law, political economy and English law. Although I did not take a degree I dare say that this year was also from an academic point of view a success in that it certainly contributed much to broaden my outlook. Occasional visits to Scotch and English law courts, with their impressive pomp and antiquated forms, made me realize that case law did not prejudice the judge to the extent I had rather expected, but left with him a sometimes unique freedom of decision and a wide responsibility, which did not exist in Germany where the abundance of codified laws in the Roman manner mostly prescribed the decision.

The coming to power of national-socialism in Germany passed nearly unobserved except for two reasons:

1. I realized that Germany was no longer treated with the same fairness and consideration in the press which I had found before.
2. There was a letter from home telling me that my father had at last been given back his old job. For this I felt grateful, not so much for financial reasons but because justice had evidently been administered properly in the case of an old and experienced civil servant.

When after three months travel in England and Wales, and another visit to Sweden, I returned late in 1933 to my home town to resume my studies there was, this time, no bitter resentment about "unpatriotic travels" as there had been years before. Amongst my fellow students at Berlin University, England was, in spite of her "bad press", looked at as a potential friend and ally. In January 1934, I was invited to a Franco-German Students Congress in Berlin which showed no signs of jingoism on the German side, of which I had rather been afraid. There was a general inclination to carry out comprehensive changes while maintaining good relations with public opinion abroad. Indeed, I nowhere found that suspected tendency to separate Germany by a fire-proof curtain from the outside world.

Some time later I joined a student party from Berlin and other universities to go to France and meet students from the French universities. We exchanged our views, volunteering in farm work, lecturing to each other, hiking and singing.

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To me, it was a splendid opportunity to gain new friends for the ideas I had elaborated during the last years. We parted as friends, resolute to mobilize all our idealism and vigour, to suffocate hatred, and to spread knowledge and understanding.

After my return to Berlin I decided to seize every opportunity to work along these lines. When trying to put through my ideas at home, in the university, I found practically no resistance. All I was asked was to apply for membership in the Party, upon which I was given all possible facilities for working. From now on I spent much of my time devising plans for meetings and camps, receiving student parties from abroad, and entertaining them at the various international clubs. Naturally the cost of this was not low, so I started giving English and French lessons, earning thereby the necessary money for what my father used to call private hobbies.

In the course of my work I had to realize more than once the considerable difficulties which existed. There were still those remnants of jingoism, personal intrigue and envy, the reproach of being "pro-French", "pro-English" or "un-German". It was sometimes easier to explain one's ideas to foreigners than to one's own countrymen. Yet I could see results. Everyone coming home from abroad showed understanding, and was prepared to help in our work and to fight orthodox mentality of the mentioned kind. And the spirit of defiance shown by my friends towards hostile accusations and actions were the finest encouragement.

At last, I started preparations for my final examination. Since that meant undivided concentration, I gave up all other activity and, finally, passed the Referendar examination in Berlin. Naturally, I meditated more than ever on my professional chances. I had no ambition to go in for the Civil Service as my father had done. I wanted to be independent under all circumstances, and, if possible, to be in a position to follow up the line I had taken. For that purpose, it seemed best to stay in Berlin which I did, working with various law courts in town and outside.

At about the same time, I got in touch with members of the Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft, a society which aimed to unite people of all vocations to foster relations with Great Britain by collaborating with British societies of the same kind. Since the Berlin branch of the society wanted a secretary, I gladly accepted an offer. This was my chance. Here was an organization through which I could pursue my plans most successfully, at least in the Anglo-German sector. My work soon proved to be most interesting and comprehensive. Branches being established in various other German towns had to be assisted. Lecture tours of British personalities were being arranged in Germany, contacts of all kinds were planned and carried out, especially within the professions. One of the first things I suggested was to establish a youth section of the society. This was accepted, and after some months the first camp was started under the auspices of the society. It was the first of many to follow, which right up to the war united the pride of our youth, doing farming, skiing, gliding, hiking and sailing in the two countries. I went out to camps in the neighbourhood and saw for myself: it was a complete success.

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After securing the financial resources, we also started a magazine which was to deal with the problems of our two countries. An exchange of letters was operated, visitors introduced to German families; in fact, there was not a single item one could possibly think of which was not included in our activity. The same was done by societies and friends on the other side of the Channel. I travelled to London now and then to discuss things with my friends. When Sir Neville Henderson was appointed British Ambassador to Berlin, contact became closer with the Embassy, and, through its assistance, with the British Council which helped in arranging and financing British lecture tours on the continent. There were, in the end, about six to seven branches of the society, and another twelve of the youth section.

I myself was completely absorbed by my work. Although I lived in Berlin I saw little of my family and my private ambitions were equal to none. With deep admiration I followed the work of my mother who, in spite of her delicate health, worked nearly all day in the local branch of the welfare organization with an unequalled spirit of vigor and enthusiasm, providing both material assistance and moral help to those who had for years been out of work. She was one of the very few women of her class who did this sort of work. Her friends mostly stood aside and could not persuade themselves to do it. To them, collecting money in the street was incompatible with their social dignity. So they chose to be a potential victim rather than a master of the social problem. When my mother was, after years, seriously taken ill, we asked her to resign. She did so with much regret - until the bomb war was started on Berlin which found her again working for ten hours a day and often part of the night, securing first aid for the bombed out and helping to evacuate them. She decidedly turned down all our proposals to evacuate herself. To her, she pleaded, so many looked up as an example expecting guidance and encouragement. She gave them both in an unrelenting spirit of faith and sacrifice.

In the field of Anglo-German co-operation our plan seemed for some time to be successful. The influence of our society had grown, its experience and dispassionate advice were frequently heeded, and the soothing influence of those who were in perpetual contact with public opinion abroad was more than once exercised. Yet in politics the alliance with Great Britain had not been realized. England preferred to wait and see. People in the United Kingdom were interested in the experiment of Germany, but which they easily confounded with communism. The methods applied shocked public opinion, and anxiety was felt about Germany's rearmament. Offers which were made by Germany were overlooked, because they were made under circumstances which did not allow Great Britain to accept or even to discuss them. There was, at times, an appalling lack of tact on our side. Obviously, the German government was badly advised in foreign politics owing to the withdrawal of many experienced diplomats, who were shocked by the harshness of governmental methods and retired to their estates. That on the other hand, paved the way for upstarts, who had neither inherited nor collected sufficient money which might have backed them up occasionally. Their lesser experience made it so much easier to say "yes" where someone who knew might have differed. I remember that when I returned from my travels to England in the years 1938 and 1939, it was most difficult to get anybody to pass on information about g Great Britain's determination to resort to war if Germany continued her policy of adding one province after the other to the Reich.

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On the other hand, the hesitation and uncertainty which prevailed in London, and the classic cry for security which had been the characteristic feature of French policy and strategy ever since World War I were not particularly helpful. There were concessions made under pressure, but no offers which might have considerably strengthened the position of those in Germany who pleaded for moderation and co-operation. I remember that even old liberals became gradually convinced of the effectiveness of the German high-handed methods. Certainly, the spectacular German successes which were largely achieved by bullying the opponent did not foster moderation.

To undertake to check radicalism and biased views had in those days become a most difficult and sometimes dangerous enterprise for several reasons:

1. Public opinion in Germany was directed by men who possessed no practical experience abroad, and simply judged their methods from the results of the day thus overlooking the psychological effect abroad.
2. As a result of this fact, pleas for moderation or warnings from liberals in most cases did not come from party men, whose credit was high, but from those whose "political reliability" was doubted and whose views were not appreciated.

It became at last a sort of fashion to speak of Great Britain as being decadent and degenerate, and I sometimes wondered whether here the wish was not the father of the thought, or whether German foreign policy had become a victim of its own propaganda. I felt that war was unavoidable and imminent. Nevertheless, my friends in the U.K. and myself did not give up, but intensified our efforts, especially in trying to influence public opinion at home, and to inform competent people as much as possible about the real attitude abroad.

I did not witness the last stage of the dramatic struggle which preceded the outbreak of hostilities. I had been called to arms and served as a gunner with the III. Heavy Artillery Battalion at Kuestrin. When I heard of the British declaration of war, which I had expected and foretold, the last bit of anxious hope had gone. I found little consolation in the fact that this meant the justification of all my warnings and expectations. I knew that now the final struggle was started which might well be fatal. I knew that my friends in England, who had with me and others tried to avoid in our small way this end, would now in a spirit of loyalty fulfil their duties as soldiers just as I did. The mission which I had chosen, and to which I had given every thought and every minute, had failed. All the idealism of the best of our nations who had done the same was in vain. They who should have carried upon their shoulders the future of our continent were now called upon to fill the graves of another useless war, which could eventually mark the end of European civilisation. The only consolation I could find was in that of being a soldier.

However, things took a very different turn from what I expected. Following a demand of my society, I was recalled to Berlin and asked to supervise the winding up of its affairs. When, after the completion of this task, I was about to rejoin my unit in Poland, I was called to the Foreign office and given a job in

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its press department. I felt most unhappy. I hated the stuffy atmosphere of this old building with its iron stairs; I hated bureaucracy with all its impersonality. But I was soon to realize that this was only part of the whole. I discovered that the spirit of Bismarck had gone, and that the home of our diplomats had been turned into something like a barrack courtyard with commandeering and reprimanding in the way an N.C.O. would do it. Germany's unfailing superiority and Great Britain's weakness were still dogmas which had to be accepted; otherwise one risked the sack. The methods and manners of the upstarts I met were in most cases rough and uncompromising. There was, particularly in the press department, hard work being done until late at night, but I sometimes wondered if it had not been better to pause for a while and think things over instead. Moreover, my former enterprising spirit was continually paralyzed by recurring illness owing to an abscess in my cheekbone. Repeatedly I tried to escape to the army. Finally, when I had found someone to take over my job I succeeded. Upon my own intervention, I was this time attached to the Luftwaffe since I was eager to join the Flying Corps.

I was sent to the Air Gunnery School at Rahmel, and, after the completion of an air gunnery course hoped that I might be taken on to the flying personnel. But that hope was a failure. I was transferred to Taormina, in Sicily, where I served with the W-Leit 2 as an R/T operator and evaluator until the activation of SIS Regiment 352, in 1944, when I was transferred to the regimental evaluation company near Graz.

In spite of the many difficulties which this particular branch of the Luftwaffe offered, I have thoroughly enjoyed my service time and have found good friends, some for life. One problem which exists in all armies of the world and which was particularly difficult with the SIS was that of selecting officers in war-time. Since I myself was to become an officer for the duration of the war, I could very well see the sometimes queer methods which were applied. In order to insure the continuity and efficiency of SIS work it became an established policy with many CO's not to send their ablest men to officer's training courses. The main reasons were:

1. In view of the heavy losses of the parachute corps of the Luftwaffe, and the ever-increasing demand of A. units a great number of Luftwaffe officers had to be taken from the ranks of the Signal Corps, which had a normal demand and practically no losses at all. Consequently, the majority of Signal Corps cadets were not likely to return to the Signal Corps.
2. Those who were picked as officers within the Signal Corps had little chances to be assigned, after completion of the various courses, to SIS again. There was always the danger of their being attached to technical units.
3. The duration of the courses amounted at times to more than ten months so that the work of officer candidates with SIS was frequently interrupted for a considerable period. Under these circumstances I managed to be promoted Technical Sergeant in 1945.

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My company witnessed the final collapse in Austria. There was a last letter from my mother, written a few days before the Russian conquest of Berlin, showing the courage and the resignation of a woman who after a life of faith and sacrifice had lost hope, but faced the end with a solemn determination rather to be buried at the side of her husband and her younger son under the debris of her home than fall into the hands of the Russians. At the same time she asked me to go on, which I shall.

After the capitulation I was transferred to OEL where I was used as an interpreter until I was called to Bad Kissingen.

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